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The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism 
Mario J. Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman 
It is a standing topic of complaint, that a man knows too little 
of himself. Be it so: but is it so certain that the legislator must 
know more? It is plain, that of individuals the legislator can 
know nothing: concerning those points of conduct which depend 
upon the particular circumstances of each individual, it is 
plain, therefore, that he can determine nothing to advantage.  
Jeremy Bentham1 
It may be admitted that, so far as scientific knowledge is 
concerned, a body of suitably chosen experts may be in the best 
position to command all the best knowledge available . . . . 
[Yet] scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge. . . . 
[A] little reflection will show that there is . . . the knowledge of 
the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with 
respect to this that practically every individual has some 
advantage over all others in that he possesses unique 
information of which beneficial use might be made, but of 
which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are 
left to him or are made with his active cooperation. 
Friedrich A. Hayek2 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent work in behavioral economics has given rise to a new 
theoretical basis for paternalist government policies.3 The literature 
of behavioral economics claims that individuals may not always act in 
their own best interests. People are not fully “rational,” as 
economists understand that term, because their choices are adversely 
affected by various cognitive biases, insufficient willpower, and 
difficulties of information processing. To the extent that such 
decision-making problems are systematic, the claim is made that 
deliberate structuring of decision contexts—such as by assigning 
appropriate default options, providing cooling-off periods for 
commitments, imposing sin taxes, and so forth—can in principle 
enhance individuals’ welfare. 
The “new” paternalism purports to differ significantly from more 
traditional paternalism. The “old” paternalism, which often grew out 
of moral or religious notions of the good, effectively ignored the 
preferences (or interests or pleasures) of the individual in favor of the 
preferences of the policymaker. It does not matter if the individual 
really enjoys consuming alcohol, says the old paternalism, because 
 
 3. See generally Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted 
O’Donoghue & Mathew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Jonathan Gruber & 
Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction ‘Rational’? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1261 (2001); 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); 
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825 (2006) 
[hereinafter O’Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes]; Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 
Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186 
(2003) [hereinafter O’Donoghue & Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism]; Cass R. Sunstein 
& Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 
(2003) [hereinafter Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron]; Richard 
H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003) 
[hereinafter Thaler & Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism]. 
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that is simply a bad preference. The new paternalism, by contrast, 
takes the individual’s own subjective preferences as the basis for 
policy recommendations. New paternalist policies allegedly help the 
individual to better achieve his own subjective well-being, which 
cognitive impediments prevent him from attaining on his own. The 
individual who drinks to excess, for instance, may actually be 
harming himself by his own internal standards, which he needs help 
in meeting because of his lack of willpower. 
Many have raised objections to the use of behavioral economics 
to justify paternalism. At the most abstract level, there are serious 
philosophical questions about the welfare standards implicit in the 
new paternalism.4 For instance, is the appropriate goal to maximize 
the hedonic satisfaction of agents, or to maximize the satisfaction of 
subjective preferences that can transcend hedonic considerations?5 In 
this Article, however, we wish to set aside the philosophical 
critique—at least as much as possible—and focus on a question of 
application: can policymakers reasonably be expected to implement 
welfare-improving paternalist policies? 
Even this question is too broad, because paternalist policymaking 
can be criticized in various ways. A public-choice critique of the new 
paternalism would ask whether policymakers have the right 
incentives to implement wise policies, given their own self-interest 
and the lobbying efforts of interested parties.6 A comparative 
institutional critique would observe that policymakers also have 
cognitive biases that could inhibit good decision-making.7 A dynamic 
critique would highlight the potential for a slippery slope from 
 
 4. See Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1245, 1260–69 (2005). 
 5. See generally Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Meet the New Boss, Same 
as the Old Boss: A Critique of the New Paternalism (Jan. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with New York Univ.). 
 6. See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 144–49 
(2006).  
 7. See generally id. For more informal critiques of the new paternalism (especially 
Sunstein & Thaler’s Libertarian Paternalism), see the weblog posts: Posting of Gary Becker, 
Libertarian Paternalism: A Critique—BECKER, The Becker-Posner Blog, 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/01/libertarian_pat_1.html (Jan. 14, 
2007, 22:07 CST); Posting of Richard Posner, Libertarian Paternalism—Posner’s Comment, 
The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/01/ 
libertarian_pat.html (Jan. 14, 2007, 21:58 CST). 
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modest paternalist policies to more intrusive ones.8 Again, we will set 
all these critiques aside, because our question is narrower: do 
policymakers have access to the knowledge needed to implement welfare-
improving paternalist policies? The answer, we argue, is no.  
The title of this Article is inspired by the “knowledge problem” 
identified by Friedrich A. Hayek in his critique of socialist central 
planning.9 In the early twentieth century, the advocates of socialism 
argued that, in principle, a central planner—equipped with all 
relevant knowledge of resource endowments, technologies, and 
preferences—could design an efficient economic plan for society.10 In 
response, Hayek said that to assume the central planner possesses all 
the relevant information about endowments, technologies, and 
preferences is to assume the problem away.11 The critical problem that 
any economic system must solve is to mobilize and use knowledge 
that “never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as 
the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”12 A signal 
virtue of a voluntary market order is that it creates conditions under 
which such information is more likely to be mobilized and used. 
The most important reason that many economists had failed to 
appreciate this knowledge problem is that they had been deceived by 
their own excessively simple models. They had taken models useful 
in understanding some limited features of the real world, such as the 
equilibrium reaction of markets to supply or demand shocks, and 
applied them to the broader problem of substituting government 
planning for market processes. They were guilty of the fallacy of the 
 
 8. See Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalist Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 411, 412–13 (2007); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is 
Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 9. F. A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation I: The Nature and History of the Problem (1935), 
in COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (F.A. Hayek ed., 1935), reprinted in F. A. HAYEK, 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 119 (1948); F. A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation II: 
The State of the Debate (1935), reprinted in HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, 
supra, at 148; F. A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation III: The Competitive “Solution” (1940), 
reprinted in HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, supra, at 181. 
 10. See Oskar Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part One, 4 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 53, 68–71 (1936); Oskar Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part Two, 4 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 123 (1937); A.P. Lerner, A Note on Socialist Economics, 4 REV. ECON. STUD. 72 
(1936). See generally Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 2. 
 11. See Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 2, at 519. 
 12. Id. 
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misplaced concrete: simple models were mistaken for a simple 
world.13 
We argue that the new paternalism spawned by behavioral 
economics faces a very similar knowledge problem and for similar 
reasons. If well-meaning policymakers possess all the relevant 
information about individuals’ true preferences, their cognitive 
biases, and the choice contexts in which they manifest themselves, 
then policymakers could potentially implement paternalist policies 
that improve the welfare of individuals by their own standards. But 
lacking such information, we cannot conclude that actual paternalism 
will make their decisions better; under a wide range of circumstances, 
it will even make them worse. New paternalists have not taken the 
knowledge problems that are evident from the underlying behavioral 
and economic research seriously enough. 
To begin, we focus the discussion by outlining several specific 
policies that authors in the new paternalist literature have advocated, 
as well as the welfare standards and cognitive biases that allegedly 
justify them. These policies are chosen as illustrative of new 
paternalist policies more generally. The remainder of the Article 
uncovers a series of knowledge-based obstacles that paternalist 
policies must overcome in order to be effective and justified. 
Specifically, paternalist policymakers must (1) identify agents’ 
“true” preferences that are to be maximally satisfied; (2) determine 
the extent of each cognitive bias or decision-making problem; (3) 
properly account for privately adopted self-debiasing measures, as 
well as how paternalist policies would affect such measures; (4) deal 
with the problem of interdependent biases; (5) anticipate unraveling 
and unlearning effects; and (6) account for heterogeneity in the 
population with respect to all of these factors. We argue that these 
factors taken together present a formidable barrier that robs the new 
paternalism of any presumption of welfare improvement—even if the 
underlying theory and empirical results of behavioral economics are 
granted. Furthermore, paternalist policymakers who lack the 
information needed to implement policies that actually assist 
individuals according to their own subjective preferences will tend to 
substitute their own. 
 
 13. See generally F. A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952). 
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II. PATERNALIST WELFARE STANDARDS 
The “new paternalist” literature, as we shall call it, emphasizes 
the possibility of making individuals “better off” according to their 
own preferences. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, for instance, 
adopt a welfare standard defined in terms of what people would do if 
they were perfectly rational: 
We intend “better off” to be measured as objectively as possible, 
and we clearly do not always equate revealed preference with 
welfare. That is, we emphasize the possibility that in some cases 
individuals make inferior choices, choices that they would change if 
they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no 
lack of willpower.14 
Similarly, Colin Camerer and coauthors choose as their welfare 
standard the decisions that individuals would make if they were fully 
rational, defined as follows: 
First, people have well-defined preferences (or goals) and make 
decisions to maximize those preferences. Second, those preferences 
accurately reflect (to the best of the person’s knowledge) the true 
costs and benefits of the available options.15 Third, in situations 
that involve uncertainty, people have well-formed beliefs about 
how uncertainty will resolve itself, and when new information 
becomes available, they update their beliefs using Bayes’s law—the 
presumed ability to update probabilistic assessments in light of new 
information.16 
The essential problem, as the new paternalists see it, is that 
individuals are unlikely to pursue choices that are “in their best 
interest”17 in many cases because of cognitive or behavioral biases. 
These include “self-control problems,” “fail[ure] to process 
 
 14. Thaler & Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 3, at 175 (emphasis added). 
 15. The second criterion seems to suggest that the agent can have less than complete 
knowledge so long as he makes efficient use of his incomplete knowledge. This means that true 
preferences are simply optimally-informed preferences. Therefore, for true preferences, in this 
attenuated sense, to be different from actual preferences requires that the real-world individual 
have less than socially-optimal incentives to acquire information. The authors do not expand 
on this point. To use this criterion as a standard for policy intervention would require the 
preference paternalist to stop short of complete information in determining true preferences. 
How far short would be difficult to assess both theoretically and empirically.  
 16. Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1214–15 (2003). 
 17. Thaler & Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 3, at 175; see also Camerer 
et al., supra note 3, at 1212. 
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information as Bayes’s rule would require,” and “systematic 
mispredictions about the costs and benefits of choices.”18 
III. PATERNALIST POLICIES ALLEGEDLY JUSTIFIED BY BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 
A wide variety of paternalistic policies could potentially be 
justified using these welfare standards, but we cannot address all of 
them. We will therefore rely, when necessary, on five illustrative 
proposals: sin taxes, default enrollment in savings plans, cooling-off 
periods for consumer purchases, risk narratives to accompany risky 
products, and employee-friendly terms in labor contracts. With each 
proposal, we also discuss the decision-making problems identified by 
behavioral economics that are used to justify the policy proposals. 
The problems with these diverse policies will not be identical, but all 
proposals will encounter at least some of the impediments outlined 
in the remainder of this Article. 
A. Sin Taxes 
Some analysts, notably O’Donoghue and Rabin19 and Gruber 
and Köszegi,20 propose to impose sin taxes—e.g., a tax on fatty 
foods—to induce better behavior. 
The behavioral justification for these sin taxes is that individuals 
are afflicted by present-bias or insufficient willpower. Very simply 
put, individuals place too much weight on the present relative to the 
future.21 This creates a bias toward getting benefits now and 
incurring costs later: people spend too much and save too little, they 
consume too much and exercise too little, they procrastinate, they 
become addicted to drugs, and so on.22 
 
 18. Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1217–18. 
 19. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 3; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 
Studying Optimal Paternalism, supra note 3. 
 20. Gruber & Köszegi, supra note 3. 
 21. For some reason the problem of placing too much weight on the future relative to 
the present (hyperopia) is ignored. See, e.g., Ran Kivetz & Anat Keinan, Repenting Hyperopia: 
An Analysis of Self-Control Regrets, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 273, 282 (2006) (concluding that 
“consumers sometimes suffer from excessive farsightedness” and “repent hyperopia in the long 
run”). 
 22. Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and 
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 393–94 (2002). 
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This is, however, a simplified account. In traditional economic 
theory, there is nothing per se irrational about placing more weight 
on the present than the future. Indeed, economic models of 
intertemporal choice almost universally assume the individual has 
some discount factor (often symbolized with the Greek letter δ) that 
he applies to future costs and benefits. For instance, someone with a 
discount factor of δ = 0.90 would consider $100 of benefits to be 
received in a year to be equivalent to $90 received immediately. The 
individual’s discount factor is generally considered a matter of 
subjective preference.23 
For the individual’s behavior to be internally consistent, 
however, the discount factor must be constant. That is, the trade-off 
between benefits at time 1 and at time 2 should depend only on 
their distance from each other, not on their distance from the 
present. Thus, for a person with a discount factor of 0.90, $100 to 
be received in two years should be equivalent to $90 in one year, 
and $100 to be received in one year should be equivalent to $90 
now. This is known as exponential discounting.24 Behavioral research, 
however, indicates that real people are inconsistent discounters. For 
instance, an individual might regard $100 to be received in two years 
as equivalent to $90 to be received in one, and yet he might regard 
$100 to be received in a year as worth only $80 now. This 
phenomenon is known as hyperbolic discounting.25 
People who engage in hyperbolic discounting may exhibit time 
inconsistency: they will make decisions about future trade-offs and 
then reverse those decisions later. For instance, if offered a choice 
between $100 in two years and $85 in one year, the person 
described above chooses the larger sum. Yet when a year has passed, 
he reverses his prior choice and takes the smaller sum ($85), because 
the $100 to be received in a year is regarded as worth only $80 now. 
 
 23. Economists sometimes refer to a discount rate instead of a discount factor. The 
discount rate is related to the discount factor in the following way: r = (1 – δ)/δ. Throughout 
this Article, we will use only discount factors. 
 24. “Exponential” refers to the fact that the discount factor must be multiplied by itself 
multiple times to discount events multiple periods in the future. For instance, in the example 
given, $100 to be received in two years would be valued at (0.90)(0.90)($100) = 
(0.90)2($100) = $81 now. 
 25. See generally Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, supra note 22 (reviewing the 
relevant literature on experiments of this nature). The seminal article in this literature is R.H. 
Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 
(1955–1956); see also GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL (2001). 
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Behavioral economists take this sort of inconsistency as evidence of 
irrationality.26 
Thus, proponents of sin taxes use hyperbolic discounting to 
explain self-control problems. Intuitively, people’s inconsistent 
behavior reflects their vulnerability to temptation when those 
temptations are near. With regard to eating, for example, a 
hyperbolic discounter might promise to start a diet tomorrow, but 
then reverse that decision once tomorrow has become today. A 
properly-calibrated sin tax, its new paternalist supporters argue, 
would make the overeater fully account for the future costs of her 
current choices by increasing the present cost. This increase in 
present cost, new paternalists argue, offsets the hyperbolic discount 
and aligns the person’s decision with “rationality.” 
B. Default Enrollment in Savings Plans 
Various authors, but most notably Thaler and Sunstein, have 
advocated automatically enrolling new employees in savings plans 
from which they could voluntarily opt out (as opposed to the more 
common practice of not enrolling employees until they opt in).27 It is 
not always clear in the literature whether this recommendation is 
directed solely at employers, or if the new paternalists would also 
support a government requirement that employers implement 
automatic enrollment. Sunstein and Thaler say the law “might 
require employers to provide automatic enrollment and allow 
employees to opt out.” Further, they say this would be consistent 
with their notion of “libertarian paternalism,” but they do not 
explicitly advocate this policy.28 Camerer et al. strongly imply that 
mandatory savings default rules may be necessary because firms lack 
sufficient incentive to offer optimal defaults.29 For this Article, we 
will consider a legal mandate on employers to adopt default 
enrollment. 
 
 26. The dollar values are used here only for illustrative purposes. In principle, the costs 
and benefits need not be monetary; they can be pleasures, pains, health effects, and so on. The 
key question is how benefits and costs of whatever form are weighed against each other when 
they occur at different points in time. 
 27. See Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 3, 
at 1159–1202; Thaler & Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 3, at 175–79. 
 28. Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 3, at 
1176–77. 
 29. Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1251–52. 
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One behavioral argument in favor of default enrollment is the 
same as that used for sin taxes: individuals are afflicted by hyperbolic 
discounting, which causes them to weigh the present too heavily. 
The present benefits of greater consumption, combined with the 
present costs of going through the enrollment process, induce 
individuals to delay enrollment and thus save too little. 
More often, however, the case for default enrollment is based on 
inertia or status quo bias: the psychological tendency of people to 
maintain current arrangements, whatever they might be.30 Sunstein 
and Thaler say that employees often fail to enroll under an opt-in 
system, but they would choose to enroll if they simply took the time 
to think carefully.31 The idea, then, is to place employees into a new 
status quo that is more likely to match their considered preferences.32 
C. Cooling-Off Periods 
There are two types of cooling-off periods. One kind creates a 
mandatory waiting period before a purchase or other decision can be 
made.33 The other creates a mandatory period following a purchase 
or other decision during which it can be reversed by one of the 
parties.34 For example, a cooling-off period for marriage requires a 
certain number of days to pass between issuance of a marriage license 
and the marriage itself; a cooling-off period for new cars allows a car 
buyer to return the car within a few days of the sale without 
penalty.35 
 
 30. For a detailed discussion see William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo 
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 33–41 (1988). 
 31. “If employers think (correctly, we believe) that most employees would prefer to join 
the 401(k) plan if they took the time to think about it and did not lose the enrollment form, 
then by choosing automatic enrollment, they are acting paternalistically by our definition of 
the term.” Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 3, at 
1172–73. 
 32. Status quo bias and hyperbolic discounting are not always clearly distinguished in 
the case for default savings enrollment. For instance, Sunstein and Thaler state that “[e]ven a 
trivial action, such as filling in some form and returning it, can leave room for failures due to 
memory lapses, sloth, and procrastination.” Id. at 1181. Although they do not specifically 
invoke the notion of hyperbolic discounting, that is the leading explanation among behavioral 
economists for procrastination in areas such as dieting and saving. 
 33. Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1240. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Without an ex post penalty, that is. The initial purchase price might be higher to 
account for costs associated with having a cooling-off period. 
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The behavioral support for cooling-off periods is the evidence 
that people make different decisions depending on whether they are 
in a “hot” or “cool” state.36 According to Sunstein and Thaler, 
“[t]he essential rationale [for cooling-off periods] is that under the 
heat of the moment, consumers might make ill-considered or 
improvident decisions.”37 Camerer et al. note that this rationale is 
supported by evidence that people make costly or even irreversible 
choices when they are in a biologically “hot” state (such as anger, 
fear, excitement, or sexual arousal) that they would not make if they 
were in a “cool state” (calm, reflective, and sober).38 New 
paternalists support the cooling-off period because it either forces 
the decision maker to delay his decision until he is in a cooler mental 
state, or allows him to reconsider once he is in such a state, thus 
allowing him to pursue his “true” preferences. 
D. Risk Narratives 
New paternalists also support the use of “risk narratives” to aid 
individuals in making risky decisions. When consumers consider 
purchasing dangerous products or engaging in dangerous activities, 
they could be informed about the relevant risks by means of 
statistical summaries of the likelihood of various harms. Alternatively, 
they could be informed by means of accounts, or narratives, about 
specific people who have suffered harm from the product or activity 
in question. Sunstein and Jolls propose that providers be required by 
law to provide such narratives: 
Specifically, the law could require firms—on pain of administrative 
penalties or tort liability—to provide a truthful account of 
consequences that resulted from a particular harm-producing use of 
the product, rather than simply providing a generalized warning or 
statement . . . .39 
We will refer to this policy as “risk narratives.” The behavioral 
justification for this policy is that people are afflicted by optimism 
bias, which causes them to underestimate their personal likelihood of 
 
 36. See George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 
AM. ECON. REV. 426 (2000) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory]. 
 37. Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 3, at 
1188. 
 38. Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1238–40. 
 39. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 212. 
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suffering adverse consequences.40 To take just one example, they 
underestimate their chances of getting into an automobile accident.41 
As a result, they will be too likely to expose themselves to risks. 
Interestingly, Jolls and Sunstein propose to correct optimism bias 
by exploiting a different bias: the availability heuristic,42 which refers 
to the tendency to judge the probability of an event based on “an 
assessment of how easily examples of the event can be called to 
mind.”43 For instance, a person whose grandmother died from a rare, 
but not genetic, illness might overestimate the likelihood of 
contracting that illness—simply because it happened to someone he 
knows. Thus, risk narratives harness the availability heuristic to 
counter optimism bias—a person’s overestimation of risk upon 
hearing a general warning is offset by an underestimation of risk 
caused by exposure to vivid stories about harmed individuals. The 
result, claim the new paternalists, should be an accurate risk 
calculation and an appropriate decision. 
E. Employee-Friendly Terms in Labor Contracts 
Sunstein and Thaler suggest various terms that could be included 
in labor contracts for the benefit of employees. For instance, they 
suggest making “for cause” rather than “at will” the default 
termination rule,44 lengthening the presumed amount of paid 
vacation time,45 and presuming protection against age discrimination 
unless the employee waives such protection.46 
In addition to these suggestions, in which the defaults are fully 
waivable, Sunstein and Thaler suggest other policies (including some 
existing policies) that are only partially waivable. For instance, they 
support the provision of the Model Employment Termination Act, 
 
 40. W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND 
WORKER RESPONSE TO HAZARD INFORMATION 95–96 (1987); Christine Jolls, Behavioral 
Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659–62 (1998). 
 41. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 205. 
 42. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: 
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207–32 (1973). 
 43. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 204. 
 44. Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 3, at 
1175. 
 45. Id. at 1176. 
 46. Id. at 1177. 
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which replaces “at will” with “for cause” termination.47 This right 
can be waived by agreement—but only if the employer agrees to 
provide a severance payment (which the Model Act sets as “one 
month’s salary for every year of employment”) in the event of a not-
for-cause termination.48 Note that the Model Act does not allow 
employees to waive their right to “for cause” termination by 
negotiating for higher regular salary or for any severance pay less 
than one month’s salary per year of employment. Similarly, Sunstein 
and Thaler reinforce the case for the Fair Labor Standards Act, which 
says that employees may not be required to work beyond 40 hours 
per week.49 This provision may be waived in return for time-and-a-
half pay.50 Note that it cannot be waived for any lower rate of pay 
(including the regular rate), even if the employer and employee agree 
upon it. 
The behavioral justification for changing default rules—and 
sometimes making the defaults costly to change—is that people are 
subject to framing effects.51 This means their decisions tend to be 
sensitive to seemingly irrelevant aspects of how the choice situation is 
described. Probably the best known type of framing effect is the 
endowment effect, which refers to people’s tendency to demand 
more compensation to give something up (their willingness to 
accept, or “WTA”) than they would have paid to acquire that same 
thing (their willingness to pay, or “WTP”).52 
For rational agents, the default should not make a difference for 
choices (at least if transaction costs are low). But for less rational 
 
 47. Id. at 1187. Sunstein and Thaler do qualify their endorsement to some extent by 
admitting that provisions with substantive limitations on waiver are “less libertarian than [they] 
might be.” Id. 
 48. Id. at 1187 (citing MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT §§ 3(a), 4(c), 
reprinted in MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 211 (Statutory Supp. 2003)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(f) (2000)). 
 51. See generally Cleotilde Gonzalez et al., The Framing Effect and Risky Decisions: 
Examining Cognitive Functions with fMRI, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1 (2005), available at 
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=sds. 
 52. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 205. For instance, students “endowed” with a 
university mug demanded more to part with the mug than they would have paid to buy it. Id. 
Given the mug’s low value relative to the students’ wealth, the two situations are effectively 
identical: they are being asked to choose between a mug and money. Regardless of whether 
they were given the mug to begin with, both mug and money were options. Yet the students’ 
choices differed. 
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agents, the default rule can matter. Employees, for example, might 
demand more compensation to eliminate a “for cause” termination 
clause than they would sacrifice to insert it. They might demand 
more compensation to give up additional vacation time than they 
would sacrifice to acquire it. The idea, then, is to structure defaults 
in labor contracts to increase the likelihood of employees getting 
favorable terms. 
IV. A BRIEF THEORY OF PREFERENCE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE 
In order to convey the underlying unity of our knowledge-based 
critique of new paternalist policy prescriptions, it is useful to outline 
our views on the evidential character of individual choice. As we have 
seen, the core of the behavioral critique of standard welfare theory is 
the claim that individuals do not always reveal their true subjective 
preferences through their actual choices (because of inadequate 
willpower or knowledge or both). We do not deny this claim about 
actual choice. 
However, the possibility that an individual’s particular choices 
can be erroneous in this sense does not mean that we must abandon 
actual choice as the ultimate evidence of welfare. It simply means 
that we must be more inclusive about which choices are relevant. 
Individuals may be aware of their own lack of self-control or that 
they make systematic mistakes. When that is the case, we would 
expect them to make choices that manifest this awareness. For 
instance, individuals may bind themselves ex ante or acquire better 
information about the consequences of their actions. This 
perspective requires us to observe a complex of choices rather than a 
single choice. In order to make sense of the behavior at issue in this 
way, we must maintain the hypothesis that some of these related 
choices do, in fact, express the related preferences of individuals.53 
For example, suppose a worker is paid in cash. On his way home, he 
is tempted to stop by a bar and drink away a good part of his salary. 
Since he often succumbs to this temptation, he may eventually take 
steps to avoid it. He may choose to take a different route home, 
bypassing the bar. He may request that his salary not be paid in cash 
 
 53. A maintained hypothesis is simply held for the moment. It may be questioned under 
different circumstances or at different times. Thus it does not amount to the view that any 
particular choice is privileged insofar as it necessarily reveals the subjective preferences of the 
individual. 
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or that his employer directly deposit his salary in a bank account. 
These choices, in conjunction with the choice-at-issue, reveal that he 
has a self-control problem.54 But we cannot infer simply from the 
choice to drink away a good portion of his salary that his choice 
displays a lack of willpower or is otherwise “irrational.” 
The choices that reveal he has a problem, however, are 
simultaneously the choices that attempt to solve the problem. Does our 
approach, therefore, imply that the individual’s solution is always 
sufficient? Can someone else know if there is a better way? These are 
separate questions. Obviously, the individual’s solution may not be 
sufficient. There may be unexploited opportunities for gain; better 
techniques of self-control may exist. But how would anyone else 
know? For another to know, he must know the benefit to the 
individual of controlling his behavior as well as the cost of self-control 
mechanisms. Since the other person does not have access to the 
contents of the individual’s mind, the only way to know is to offer a 
wider array of techniques to the individual and observe if he chooses 
one of them. But absent an actual choice by the individual, we 
cannot know.  
Some have argued that since statements are speech-acts, we can 
use what people say about their choices as evidence of the possible 
irrationality of those choices.55 For instance, if an individual says he 
wants to lose weight, this would constitute evidence of his actual 
preferring to do so—and thus of his “irrationality” in continuing to 
overeat. While we should not exclude this possibility entirely, it is 
important to point out that speech-acts and other choices generally 
have very different cost-benefit structures. The incentives to say 
something are not the same as the incentives to do the thing spoken 
of. 
The individual can say, “I want to save more, but I am too weak-
willed.” What does this mean for purposes of economic analysis or 
public policy? It is entirely unclear. Is the individual expressing a 
preference or a simple desire? A preference reflects the willingness to 
 
 54. Just as the worker has various means to deal with his self-control problem, 
acquisition of more information, solicitation of expert advice, and attempts to improve one’s 
computational skills plausibly reflect the preference to improve the knowledge content of 
decisions. 
 55. See Andrew Caplin, Economic Theory and Psychological Theory: Bridging the Divide, 
in THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS: A HANDBOOK 336, 359–
60 (Andrew Caplin & Andrew Schotter eds., 2008). 
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incur the opportunity cost, whereas a desire is just a generally 
favorable attitude toward something irrespective of opportunity cost. 
The statement itself does not reveal a serious willingness to incur the 
opportunity cost of more savings. It is evidence simply of his 
willingness to incur the costs of the statement to attain its benefits.56 
The saying and the doing are different actions. Saying is not by itself 
evidence of true and comprehensive underlying preferences. 
V. THE PATERNALIST’S DILEMMA 
To understand the fundamental problem facing the paternalist, 
recall that the rationale for new paternalism is that the individual has 
cognitive and behavioral limitations that prevent him from either 
recognizing difficulties in the pursuit of his welfare or efficiently 
overcoming them. This implies a complex interrelationship between 
the knowledge needed by the paternalist and the knowledge 
possessed, or capable of being acquired, by the individual. 
The paternalist must be smarter than the target agents. He must 
know their preferences better than they do in order to know just 
what their difficulties are and how they may be efficiently overcome. 
Yet both the problems and the solutions are contextual. They 
depend on local and personal knowledge. Thus, even if the 
paternalist has better theoretical knowledge about cognitive and 
behavioral biases, it will be of little use unless he has considerable 
local knowledge about a specific individual’s preferences, self-control 
problems, available options, and so forth. Ultimately, if the goal is 
superior action on the part of agents, the superior theoretical 
knowledge of the paternalist cannot be directly relevant to the 
individual, except by way of advice. The best course of action for the 
individual to take will depend on what Hayek called “knowledge of 
the particular circumstances of time and place.”57 This includes 
knowledge of locally and temporally contingent external facts, facts 
about the individual’s personal traits and, more specifically, facts 
about particular temptations and strategies to avoid them. 
Sometimes these facts are consciously held and utilized, while in 
other cases they may be tacitly or unconsciously held and utilized. 
 
 56. Individuals may wish to signal to others or to themselves that they are prudent 
without being prudent. Thus they are willing to incur the costs of deception for its benefits. 
This does not imply that they are willing to incur the costs of actual prudence for its benefits. 
 57. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 2, at 521. 
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This knowledge is largely inaccessible by paternalists and yet, without 
it, they cannot use their putatively superior theoretical knowledge to 
develop welfare-improving policies. 
In the remaining sections of this Article, we will discuss in 
greater detail the many kinds of knowledge that paternalist 
policymakers would need to have in order to improve individual 
choices. 
VI. IDENTIFYING THE AGENT’S TRUE PREFERENCES 
The issue is whether policymakers—including voters, politicians, 
judges, and bureaucrats—can generate general, clearly articulable 
rules in the form of taxes, subsidies, cooling-off periods, and so 
forth, to counteract what would otherwise be the inferior decisions 
of agents. One prerequisite for welfare-improving policies is that 
policymakers must possess superior knowledge of people’s “true” 
preferences—that is, the preferences the new paternalists allegedly 
wish to advance. 
Evidence suggests that agents may not have “true” preferences at 
all.58 This, in itself, presents a problem for the new paternalist 
paradigm; we cannot claim to be making people better according to 
their preferences if such preferences do not exist. But we will assume, 
arguendo, that true preferences do in fact exist. Let us first address 
the general question: Does the paternalist know true preferences 
better than the agent himself? 
A. Local Knowledge of True Preferences 
The relevant question is whether policymakers can be expected 
to have better knowledge of true preferences than the agents in 
question. Since “better” is defined in terms of the individual’s 
subjective welfare (as opposed to old-style paternalism), we must 
compare the relative ability of individuals to make welfare-enhancing 
decisions for themselves with the ability of outsiders to decide on 
their behalf.  
 
 58. The new paternalists admit this. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 3, at 1164 (“If the arrangement of the 
alternatives has a significant effect on the selections the customers make, then their true 
‘preferences’ do not formally exist.”). In general, the question of whether preferences formally 
exist will arise whenever individuals exhibit preference reversals or make frame-dependent 
choices. 
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Lacking direct evidence on the relative ability of individuals 
versus government to discover preferences, let us consider the 
relative ability of individuals versus close friends and family members. 
In a recent study, Joel Waldfogel compares the valuations by 
consumers of items they purchased themselves to their valuations of 
similar items purchased for them as gifts.59 The gift-givers were 
friends and extended and immediate family members—in general, 
individuals who would likely have some personal, local, and 
sometimes tacit knowledge of the recipients’ preferences.60 The 
consumer goods in question were familiar to both giver and receiver, 
did not involve intertemporal choices, and were not uncertain in the 
sense that people did not think they were buying one thing and got 
another.61 In other words, these were relatively “simple” 
consumption choices. If the consumers were no better or worse at 
determining what satisfied their preferences than the gift-givers, we 
should expect the consumers’ ex post evaluations of the self-
purchased items versus gifts to have been about equal, on average. 
Instead, “consumers’ own purchases generate[d] between 10% and 
18% more value, per dollar spent, than items received as gifts.”62 
Is it likely that the ignorance of consumers about their own 
preferences made them incapable of accurately evaluating the relative 
values of self-purchases and gifts? Perhaps they simply reaffirmed 
their decisions in the survey that was undertaken by Waldfogel 
shortly after the decisions were made. However, most of the 
products purchased by either party were of the type that would likely 
show their “true value” rather quickly—sweaters, shirts, books, CDs, 
jackets, hats, and so forth.63 So it seems reasonable to expect that 
consumers’ ignorance about their own preferences was largely 
resolved ex post. If this is so, then it makes sense to use consumer 
valuations of the relative efficiency of own-purchases and those of 
gift-givers. In view of the evidence that “consumers fare better [at 
identifying their own preferences] than all types of givers except 
 
 59. Joel Waldfogel, Does Consumer Irrationality Trump Consumer Sovereignty?, 87 REV. 
ECON. AND STAT. 691 (2005). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Most of the purchases were of this sort, that is, short-run experience goods. 
However, the value of a few purchases could not be immediately ascertained, such as 
electronics, kitchen appliances, or perhaps video games. See id. at 695 tbl.3. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009 10:03 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
924 
significant others and possibly grandparents . . . it seems unlikely that 
an alternative chooser would do better than friends, siblings, and 
parents, all of whom have substantial amounts of information about 
the ultimate consumer’s preferences.”64 
In short, even friends and family have a difficult time doing any 
better than the individual himself in making welfare-enhancing 
choices. Yet friends and family are more likely than policymakers to 
have the local knowledge necessary to make wise decisions. Thus, 
Waldfogel’s study provides at least suggestive evidence of the 
difficulty new paternalists will face in crafting wise policies. The basic 
problem is that paternalist policymakers need a baseline of “true” 
preferences to satisfy, but the knowledge of such preferences is very 
hard to access. That individuals sometimes have difficulty 
determining their own preferences does not mean outsiders will do 
any better; they can also do worse. 
B. Conflicting Preference Sets 
We now turn to the more technical question of how 
policymakers might go about determining what true or informed 
preferences are, assuming once again that they do exist. The case for 
a decision-making bias is typically based on the existence of an 
inconsistency in individual choices, which presumably corresponds to 
an internal inconsistency of preferences. But identifying an 
inconsistency in someone’s behavioral preferences (meaning those 
that actually determine choice) is not the same as identifying 
someone’s true preferences. To do that, we would have to know 
which of the inconsistent behavioral preferences better represents the 
agent’s actual welfare. We will consider three types of bias for which 
this problem arises: hyperbolic discounting, framing and endowment 
effects, and hot and cold state effects. 
1. Hyperbolic discounting 
Sometimes individuals make different choices about present 
versus future consumption depending on the time at which the 
decision is made, even if the two periods being compared do not 
change. To take the example given earlier, in the discussion of sin 
taxes, an individual today might choose $100 to be received in two 
 
 64. Id. at 695. 
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years over $85 to be received in one year, and yet reverse that 
decision when a year has passed and choose $85 immediately over 
$100 the next year (even though nothing else has changed). This 
inconsistency in choice is modeled as an underlying inconsistency in 
preferences.65 We could assume—as do Gruber and Köszegi66 and 
O’Donoghue and Rabin67—that the true preferences are those 
represented by the more far-sighted choice, and the question 
becomes how to make the near-term choices correspond to the far-
sighted preferences. But what basis is there for this assumption? We 
could just as easily designate the more near-sighted preferences as 
the correct ones, and then aim to make far-term choices better 
correspond to them. 
To put it another way, an internally consistent person would 
have a single discount factor. In our example, we have an individual 
with two discount factors: 0.90 between any two adjacent years in 
the future, and 0.80 between the present year and the next year. This 
person exhibits time inconsistency by choosing $100 over $85 when 
both are in the future, then reversing that decision by choosing $85 
over $100 when the $85 is to be received immediately. One way to 
make this person internally consistent would be to make him use a 
discount factor of 0.90 for all his intertemporal decisions. Thus, he 
must choose the $100 later over the $85 earlier every time. But 
another way to make this person internally consistent would be to 
make him use a discount factor of 0.80 for all intertemporal 
decisions, so that he will choose the $85 earlier over the $100 later 
every time. As either of these “corrections” would make the agent’s 
behavior consistent, we lack a means of saying which discount factor 
corresponds to the agent’s “true” preferences, even if we concede 
that one of them must. 
To make the problem more vexing, the paternalist may not face a 
choice between just two discount factors. The paternalist 
policymaker might favor the more far-sighted (larger) discount 
factor, the more near-sighted (smaller) discount factor, or some 
discount factor that lies somewhere in between, reflecting an 
 
 65. Inconsistency in preferences, however, need not produce inconsistency in or reversal 
of choices. See HOWARD RACHLIN, THE SCIENCE OF SELF-CONTROL 39 (2000). In this case 
we would have “myopia,” that is, a large short-run discount factor and a small long-run 
discount factor, without preference reversal. 
 66. Gruber & Köszegi, supra note 3. 
 67. O’Donoghue & Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, supra note 3. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009 10:03 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
926 
intermediate degree of patience. If there is inconsistency between 
two different preference sets, there is no reason for the paternalist to 
assume the agent’s “true” preferences must be one of those two. 
Moreover, the research on time discounting does not reveal a 
simple binary choice process, wherein the individual applies one 
discount factor when comparing two future periods and another 
discount factor when comparing the present period and a future 
period. Instead, the discount factor varies continuously depending 
on how far away the nearer period is.68 For example, the individual 
might apply the discount factor 0.98 when comparing rewards to be 
received ten versus eleven years in the future; the discount factor 
0.90 when comparing rewards five versus six years in the future; the 
discount factor 0.80 when comparing rewards two versus three years 
in the future; and the discount factor 0.70 when comparing rewards 
now and a year from now. Thus, in economic terminology, 
preferences are truly hyperbolic, not just quasi-hyperbolic.69 If finding 
the agent’s true preferences means finding a single time-discounting 
factor that can be used as the basis for exponential discounting 
(which is time consistent), then the existence of true hyperbolic 
discounting means the paternalist has infinitely many different 
options to choose from—and no objective means of doing so. 
There have, however, been some attempts to justify using the 
lower or long-term rate. The first is based on the assumption that 
individuals have “stable lifetime preferences” and thus any temporary 
deviation from them is a mistake.70 This is reinforced by the idea 
that, for most of the future periods about which plans are made, a 
higher (more patient) discount factor is applied. Unfortunately, the 
 
 68. In his early work, Richard Thaler finds three effective annual discount rates ranging 
from 345% over a one-month horizon to 120% over a one-year horizon to only 19% over a 
ten-year horizon. Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 
ECON. LETTERS 201, 201–07 (1981). 
 69. See AINSLIE, supra note 25, at 28–35. “Quasi-hyperbolic” refers to a discounting 
process involving only two discount factors: one that applies between any two future periods 
(lower), and an additional discount that applies between the present and any future period 
(higher). “Hyperbolic” refers to a continuously declining discount rate as the future periods of 
comparison become more distant. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 
112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 446–51 (1997). 
 70. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and 
Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision-Makers, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 11, 26, available at http://www.stanford.edu/~bernheim/Behavioral%20 
Public%20Economics%20Final.pdf). 
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idea of stable lifetime preferences is merely an assumption. 
Furthermore, to draw normative significance from the stylized fact 
that a higher discount factor applies to more periods than does the 
lower discount factor seems little more than an attempt to derive an 
“ought” from an “is.” 
Moreover, the “mistake” interpretation founders on the shoals of 
truly hyperbolic discounting. When there are only two discount 
factors, it is deceptively simple to designate one of them as “correct.” 
When there are infinitely many discount factors, the selection is not 
nearly so simple. We suspect that advocates of the “mistake” 
interpretation have been misled by the quasi-hyperbolic 
approximation, which was originally adopted more for its 
mathematical tractability (relative to models of true hyperbolic 
discounting) than for its accuracy in describing human behavior.71 
The presence of more than two discount factors raises the 
possibility that, unless the discount factor representing the highest 
degree of patience is always regarded as the appropriate standard, 
decision-makers can be too future-oriented as well as too impatient. 
They may fail to recognize that life is not forever and may not pluck 
enough flowers. Specifically, Kivetz and Keinan have shown in a 
number of studies that as temporal perspective lengthens, individual 
regret over the failure to seize the pleasures of life grows while guilty 
regret over indulgence falls, with the former ultimately 
predominating.72 
A second attempt to justify using a longer-term rate as the 
normative rate is based on the idea that a planning rate is considered 
more than the acting rate. In other words, the planning rate is the 
result of a calm, collected, and thoughtful process while the acting 
rate is dominated by transient passions.73 But this is far from the only 
plausible explanation of the difference between short and long-term 
discount factors. First, it is not unreasonable to believe that the 
 
 71. See AINSLIE, supra note 25, at 210 n.29, 214 n.21; George-Marios Angeletos et al., 
The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation and Empirical Evaluation, 15 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 47, 50 (2001). 
 72. This does not imply that the choice of a long-run benefit (“virtue”) over a short-
term indulgence (“vice”) is always the source of predominant regret in the long run, but that it 
can be, especially when the optimal decision is not obvious. See Kivetz & Keinan, supra note 
21, at 274. 
 73. Daniel Read, Which Side Are You On? The Ethics of Self-Command, 27 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 681, 685 (2006). Read calls the planner the “pre-agent” and the actor “the agent.” 
Id. 
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opportunity costs of “virtue” become more evident as the moment of 
action arrives.74 Far from being a less considered behavior, the 
present-oriented action may therefore actually be more considered 
and better informed. Second, Paul Glimcher and coauthors have 
found that a lower (more impatient) discount factor is applied 
whenever one of the outcomes compared is the earliest possible.75 
Specifically, agents apply the same discount factor for a choice 
between today and one day later as they do for a choice between 
sixty days from now and sixty-one days from now, when the latter is 
the earliest possible option.76 This suggests that considered choice may 
not be at issue, because the same discount factor is applied even 
when the earliest possible date is two months away. 
Third, the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting may not be a 
strict matter of time-preference at all. Ariel Rubinstein has argued 
that differences in time periods seem more similar when agents 
contemplate them in the farther future than in the near term.77 
Goods delivered in 101 days or 111 days are more similar to each 
other than the same two goods delivered in 1 day or 11 days.78 
Under these circumstances the delay-attribute more or less drops out 
of consideration in the first case but not in the second. Thus the 
more patient “long-run” discount factor is the result of a relative 
failure to envision or appreciate future time delays.79 This suggests 
that the short-term rate or rates might be more considered. 
2. Framing and endowment effects 
The framing problem is also evidenced by individuals making 
different choices for identical choice problems presented in different 
ways. Again, the inconsistency in choice allegedly reveals an 
underlying inconsistency of preferences. If we set aside that the 
 
 74. “The information available to the acting-agent about the local consequences of a 
specific choice will often be better than the information available to the pre-agent. When a 
dieter changes his mind and has tiramisu after promising not to, it might be because he is 
weak-willed, or it might be because he has only now realized how appealing the tiramisu is.” 
Id. 
 75. See Paul William Glimcher, Joseph Kable & Kenway Louie, Neuroeconomic Studies of 
Impulsivity: Now or Just as Soon as Possible?, AM. ECON. REV., May 2007, at 142. 
 76. Id. at 143–45. 
 77. Ariel Rubinstein, “Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, 44 
INT’L ECON. REV. 1207 (2003). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1210. 
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different frames might actually matter to the individual’s subjective 
well-being and suppose the frame really is irrelevant80 we still have to 
ask: what are the true preferences? If the choice under Frame A 
corresponds to preference set A, and the choice under Frame B 
corresponds to preference set B, either A or B could represent the 
agent’s true preferences. And here, too, the paternalist does not 
necessarily face a simple binary choice, as A and B might not 
represent the only way to frame the problem. 
Take the example of vacation time in employment contracts. 
Suppose that potential employees feel different, and thus negotiate 
differently, when more vacation time is a default part of the contract 
than when it is not. Under default A (less vacation time), added 
vacation time seems less valuable, so the employee does not strongly 
negotiate for it. Under default B (more vacation time), that added 
time seems more valuable, so the employee strongly resists its 
reduction.81 This is a classic case of willingness-to-pay differing from 
willingness-to-accept, and thus evidence of internally inconsistent 
preferences. But which default rule corresponds to the agent’s true 
preferences, representing his actual trade-off between leisure time 
and money? This question is crucial to the policy choice of an 
optimal default, since the wage rate will fall to compensate for longer 
vacation periods, yet the theory provides the policymaker with no 
means of choosing.82 
3. Hot and cold states 
The existence of a bias based on emotional states is supposedly 
revealed by an individual making different choices depending on 
whether he is in a “hot” or “cold” state. For instance, a person may 
choose to have sex or eat unhealthily when in a hot (aroused or 
hungry) state, yet refuse the same opportunity when in a cold (not-
 
 80. Madrian and Shea argue that framing the 401(k) participation decision in such a way 
that enrollment is the default is likely to be seen by employees as “implicit advice” from 
employers who presumably know better. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of 
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1182 
(2001). To the extent that this is the case, framing really does matter because it conveys 
information. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra 
note 3, at 1176. 
 82. In cases like this, the tendency of the policymaker is to adopt an objective standard 
of welfare and set the default to the option that is “objectively” better. This constitutes an 
abandonment of the new paternalist project. 
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aroused or not-hungry) state. This seems to reveal an 
inconsistency—although this is likely a case when the emotional state 
itself has a large effect on the actual satisfaction gained from the 
activity. But let us suppose a real inconsistency is revealed here: the 
sex or junk food would be as physically satisfying either way. 
Emotional state A yields one choice, while emotional state B yields 
another. Still, which choice reflects the agent’s true preferences?83  
It might be that we could ascertain the true preferences on the 
basis of the absence or presence of subsequent regret. Consider that 
indulging in a pleasure as a result of a hot state may lead to a feeling 
of regret in the form of guilt—but guilt itself is a hot state.84 It can 
and does pass. In the longer run, however, the individual may be 
relieved that he has not missed out on the pleasures of life. Which is 
the correct standpoint for the paternalist to adopt: the avoidance of 
immediate feelings of guilty regret after the indulgence, or the later 
avoidance of wistful regret over missed pleasures? The first presumes 
that the initial hot state (sexual arousal or hunger) distorts true 
preferences; the second presumes that the subsequent hot state (guilt) 
distorts true preferences. A reasonable case could be made for 
adopting either of these perspectives.85 
Thus there are two preference sets to choose from, and again, no 
basis by which to choose except perhaps the paternalist’s own 
preferences. And if we allow the existence of an interaction between 
the state of the agent during choice and his experience of the 
consequences of the choice, there may be more than two preference 
sets for the paternalist policymaker to choose from. As George 
Loewenstein recognizes, 
[I]t would clearly be suboptimal to make decisions that ignore 
visceral factors. Visceral factors do affect the marginal utility of 
different activities: eating is more pleasurable when one is hungry, 
and sex is more pleasurable when one is aroused. . . . Clearly, 
welfare maximization lies somewhere between the two extremes of 
 
 83. If we interpret this situation as a conflict of multiple selves (hot self/cold self) then 
taking sides is arbitrary. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Addiction and Cue-
Triggered Decision Processes, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1558, 1572 (2004) (“Under that 
interpretation, our use of cold preferences as a welfare standard is arbitrary.”). 
 84. See Kivetz & Keinan, supra note 21, at 280. 
 85. In the end, the application of the regret criterion is an empirical matter. 
Unfortunately, there has not been very much research on the pattern of regret consequences of 
actions. 
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making decisions that ignore visceral factors and treating visceral 
influences as no different from any other influence on tastes.86 
Thus even if we were to assume unambiguous post-decision regret, 
this must be balanced against heightened enjoyment during or 
immediately following the decision. The paternalist policymaker is 
therefore faced with deciding the correct balance of the preferences 
corresponding to hot and cold states.87 
One possible response is to ask which preference set actually 
leads to greater long-run happiness.88 Perhaps “cold” states typically 
lead to choices that produce more actual happiness. Here, the 
philosophical issues that we hoped to set aside in this Article become 
impossible to bracket. How shall we measure actual happiness? Is it 
physical pleasure, as a hedonist would suggest? Or do the agent’s 
other values also come into play? And if the latter—as seems most 
plausible to us—then how heavily should those values be weighed 
against physical pleasure (which is surely relevant even if not 
decisive)? Emotional states A and B may simply correspond to 
different relative weights attached to physical pleasure and other 
values—and again, theory gives us no means of determining which of 
these sets of weights, or which combination of these weights, 
corresponds to the agent’s “true” preferences.89 
In each case, the paternalist has to decide which among equally 
viable candidates to designate as the true preferences that will be 
privileged by policy. 
 
 86. Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory, supra note 36, at 429. 
 87. The complexity of this problem has been recognized by Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue, who recognize that no clear normative standard can come from this “dual-
system” analysis. See George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and 
Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior 19–21 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/edo1/will.pdf). The paternalist must 
distinguish, on the one hand, the rational adaptation to the unconscious input of the affective 
system, that is, to the tacit personal knowledge of the kinds and sources of the individual’s 
well-being, and, on the other hand, the “excessive” yielding to affective demands because of 
limited willpower. Id. at 38. 
 88. Is the total undiscounted amount of lifetime happiness the relevant standard? On 
the other hand, if we must discount, then the issues of the previous section on discount rates 
reassert themselves. 
 89. One of the factors that enables Bernheim and Rangel to rationalize their use of cold 
preferences as the welfare standard is the assumption that the individual simply seeks to 
maximize discounted hedonic utility. See Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 83, at 1572 (“Since 
the individual has only one set of [true] preferences, discounted experiential utility . . . 
accurately measures his well-being, and is unambiguously the appropriate welfare standard.”). 
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VII. DISCOVERING THE EXTENT OF DECISION-MAKING BIAS 
It is not enough to know that a bias exists. Nor is it enough to 
have identified a baseline of “true” preferences. The paternalist 
policymaker also needs to know the extent of the bias in order to 
design the appropriate solution to counteract it. This is not an easy 
task. Numerous problems arise in this process. For the remainder of 
this section, we will assume for the sake of argument that the 
problem (discussed in Part I) of identifying “true” preferences has 
somehow been resolved. 
A. Lack of Precision in Measuring Extent of Bias 
Precision in measuring the extent of any given bias has 
substantial policy relevance. A large bias will justify some policies that 
a small bias will not. The size of the bias will also affect the optimal 
degree of intervention. Excessive intervention can reduce welfare 
below pre-intervention levels. We will focus on four illustrative biases 
whose extent matters for policy: hyperbolic discounting, status quo 
bias, hot and cold states, and optimism bias. 
1. Hyperbolic discounting 
In order to craft wise policies to correct problems created by 
present-bias, it is necessary to determine the extent of present-bias. If 
people need encouragement to save more, the extent of their 
present-bias will affect how much encouragement they require. The 
optimal size of a fat tax depends on the extent of present-bias in 
eating choices. Only after determining the extent of present-bias in 
the areas they wish to regulate could paternalists suggest a possible 
solution to counter present-bias. 
Unfortunately, “[t]here is extraordinary variation across studies, 
and sometimes even within studies” in estimates of intertemporal 
discount factors.90 Even when the same data set is analyzed using 
different, but standard, econometric techniques, there is often large 
variation in discount estimates.91 Given the current technology of 
estimation, the “spectacular disagreement among dozens of 
 
 90. Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, supra note 22, at 393. 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 385 (using an example with a range of discount rates between 1% and 
14%). 
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studies”92 implies an even greater variation in the predicted welfare 
effects of different policies based on “correcting” rates of excessive 
impatience. As we see below, even rather small differences in 
attributed discount factors can be associated with significant 
differences in welfare. We discuss two examples. 
In an important Brookings study on savings for retirement, 
David Laibson and coauthors seek to evaluate the welfare impact of 
tax-deferred defined contribution retirement saving (DC) plans to 
consumers with self-control problems.93 Such consumers tend to 
under-save because, although they recognize the “true” value of 
savings as between periods 2 and 3 and all other delayed pairs, they 
are excessively impatient as between the present and the next period 
(that is, they engage in quasi-hyperbolic discounting). As a 
consequence, individuals continually plan to save in the future, 
according to their true preferences, but always fall short of their 
goals when the time arrives. Therefore, these individuals, if 
sophisticated enough to correctly forecast their lapses from optimal 
discounting, would value a commitment technology that would bind 
them to their plans, especially if it were costless and perfect. DC 
pension plans approximate such a technology because there are 
generally tax penalties for early withdrawal and because, if individuals 
change (lower) their contributions, the effect in increased 
consumption is somewhat delayed.94 Laibson and coauthors provide 
several simulations that suggest significant differences in the welfare-
enhancing effects of making DC plans available to individuals with 
different present-bias factors.95 The present bias factor is typically 
represented by β, which is the additional discount applied to future 
periods when they are compared to the present. According to 
Laibson’s calculations, the gross value of a DC plan to a twenty year-
old high school graduate varies from 28% of his current annual 
consumption if β = 1 (that is, no present-bias), to 71% if β = 0.85, to 
99% if β = 0.8.96 And if β = 0.60, the impatience factor derived from 
 
 92. Id. at 389. In addition, “there is no evidence of methodological progress in that the 
range of estimates does not seem to be shrinking with time.” Dilip Soman et al., The Psychology 
of Intertemporal Discounting: Why are Distant Events Valued Differently from Proximal Ones?, 
16 MARKETING LETTERS 347, 354 (2005). 
 93. David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, Self-Control and Saving for 
Retirement, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 91. 
 94. Id. at 144–45. 
 95. Id. at 145–67. 
 96. Id. at 165. 
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much of the experimental evidence, the linear extrapolations of these 
simulations, suggest that “the true hyperbolic [excessive impatience] 
effect is two to three times as large as the effects reported 
above . . . .”97 These results indicate that the desirability of policies 
to encourage more savings depends crucially on the extent of bias. 
Moreover, the appropriate amount of encouragement (i.e., how 
large the tax penalty for early withdrawal should be) will also depend 
on the extent of bias. Too much encouragement can cause a 
departure from the standard of true preferences that is as great as or 
greater than too little encouragement.98 
Now we turn our attention to optimal sin taxes. O’Donoghue 
and Rabin develop a model in which consumers choose between a 
composite good and a “sin good” defined as an immediately 
enjoyable good with longer-run bad health consequences.99 
O’Donoghue and Rabin simulate optimal taxes for plausible values 
of the other relevant parameters, as both the proportion of the 
population with self-control problems and the extent of their self-
control problems vary. For example,  
[i]f half the population is fully self-controlled while the other half 
the population has a very small present bias of β=0.99, then the 
optimal tax is 5.15%. If instead the half the population with self-
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Accurately ascertaining the extent of the impatience bias is also important in 
assessing the welfare impact of Social Security on naïve agents—that is, agents who have self-
control problems of which they are unaware or which they forecast incorrectly. One argument 
for compulsory Social Security is that such individuals will, if left to themselves, save less than 
they “really” want and thus have a lower than optimal retirement income. Ayse İmrohoroğlu 
and coauthors conclude, based on their simulations, that Social Security does not raise welfare 
from the perspective of almost any age for individuals with impatience factors in the 
neighborhood of 0.85 to 0.90. Ayse İmrohoroğlu, Selahattin İmrohoroğlu & Douglas H. 
Joines, Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Social Security, 118 Q.J. ECON. 745, 781 (2003). 
This is because an unfunded retirement scheme, such as Social Security, lowers the aggregate 
capital stock and thus income at all ages. Id. at 770. While Social Security redistributes existing 
income to those in retirement, “the utility gains from increased old-age consumption are too 
small to offset the losses from reduced consumption earlier in life.” Id. at 776. However, all 
this changes, as may be expected, when the degree of impatience increases. Under those 
circumstances, the amount of under-saving may be so great that the increase in income during 
retirement brought about by Social Security payments will swamp the effects of a lower 
aggregate capital stock. In fact, the simulations reveal that “[s]ocial security does significantly 
raise welfare with β = 0.60 . . . .” Id. at 781. Obviously, government policies regarding savings 
for retirement will be affected substantially by the extent of the impatience bias. A relatively 
small bias may suggest the substitution, in whole or part, of fully-funded or private retirement 
plans for the current Social Security scheme. 
 99. O’Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 3. 
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control problems has a somewhat larger present bias of β =0.90—
which is still a smaller present bias (larger β) than often discussed in 
the literature—the optimal tax is 63.71%.100  
Therefore, if the government were to estimate the present bias as the 
latter (lower β) when in fact it was the former, it would reduce 
consumer welfare by imposing a tax about twelve times too large. 
Notice also that O’Donoghue and Rabin’s approach includes 
assumptions about what percentage of the population is afflicted by 
present-bias101—an issue we will address more fully later. 
The difficulty for policy prescriptions is that no one is very 
confident about the true impatience or present-bias factor (β), nor 
about the proportion of the population subject to the bias. This is 
one reason that, in the various studies discussed above, the authors 
show the effects on welfare for various calibrations of the relevant 
parameters. In sum, the extent of the impatience bias is very 
significant in determining whether a specific paternalist policy 
increases or decreases welfare relative to the status-quo. Current 
estimates are unable to provide a basis for policy prescriptions that 
reliably increase welfare. At best, policies derived from the current 
state of knowledge can only produce certain objective results, like 
more saving or lower junk-food consumption, that may or may not 
increase welfare. Therefore, the new paternalism, supposedly based 
on the underlying normative preferences of individuals, shades into 
the old paternalism, based on what is “objectively best” in the 
opinion of an outside observer. 
2. Status quo bias 
If default savings plans are justified on grounds of status quo 
bias, then we need a measure of the extent of that bias. The greater 
the status quo bias, the more the selected default savings plan 
matters because more people will stay with it longer.102 If that plan is 
not optimal, then individuals will be stuck in a relatively low-welfare 
savings outcome. How bad this situation is and how long people will 
 
 100. Id. at 1838. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Status-quo bias is usually estimated by the (disproportionate) frequency with which 
the status-quo option is accepted by decision-makers. The duration of the bias—how long 
people stay with the option—has not been systematically measured. 
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be in it depend on the welfare losses from suboptimal savings and 
the extent of the bias.103 
In their seminal study, Samuelson and Zeckhauser found that the 
status-quo bias, even where statistically significant, differs in size 
across tasks and alternatives—from substantial effects to small 
effects.104 Whether this is due to systematic contextual factors, the 
inherent variability of the phenomenon, or difficulties in 
measurement technique, is impossible to say at this time. 
Furthermore, whether these effects, regardless of their magnitude, 
are caused by rational transaction cost factors or behavioral biases is 
difficult to determine.105 
Moreover, Samuelson and Zeckhauser found that the bias is 
larger when the individual’s preference for a neutrally-presented 
alternative to the status-quo is weaker.106 Thus, the size of the bias is 
likely to depend on the default; if people know they are already 
saving something by default, they may be less likely to take the time 
to change to a better plan. Because of the generally low returns to 
the default allocations, Choi and coauthors found that automatic 
enrollment produced offsetting effects: “While higher participation 
rates promote wealth accumulation, the low default savings rate and 
the conservative default investment fund undercut accumulation,” 
and, in their sample, the two effects were approximately equal in 
magnitude.107 So, in the aggregate, these individuals were in no 
better position than before. On the other hand, the farther the 
 
 103. The issue here is somewhat more complex because what we must know is optimal 
401(k) savings, since people save in other ways. This is only indirectly related to the general 
rate of excessive impatience. 
 104. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 15–17 tbls.1a, 1b & 1c. The absolute 
size of the status-quo bias is SQ-NEUT and the relative size is (SQ-NEUT)/NEUT where SQ 
is the choice frequency for a given alternative when it is in the status-quo position and NEUT 
is the frequency when the alternative is presented neutrally. Id. at 15–17. 
 105. In their analysis of the impact of status-quo bias on decisions regarding enrollment 
in 401(k) programs, Madrian and Shea observe, “Unfortunately, there is no way to disentangle 
the magnitude of rational, transaction costs motivated procrastination from behavioral, self-
control motivated procrastination in the data.” Madrian & Shea, supra note 80, at 1180. They 
do note, however, that there is a “possibility of the latter.” Id. 
 106. They state their equivalent conclusion in terms of the converse proposition: “The 
stronger was an individual’s preference for a selected alternative, the weaker was the bias.” 
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 8. See also James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte 
Madrian & Andrew Metrick, Optimal Defaults, AM. ECON. REV., May 2003, at 180, 183–84. 
 107. James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian & Andrew Metrick, For Better or 
For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior 2 (Pension Research Council, Working 
Paper No. 2002-02, 2002). 
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default is from the individual’s optimum savings rate, the greater the 
probability that he will opt out of the default and begin saving 
optimally. A sufficiently inappropriate default will weaken the status-
quo bias and motivate change.108 In this case, the paternalist should 
not be searching for a welfare-enhancing default, but for one that is 
far enough from it to encourage active decision-making. Therefore, 
the nature of the paternalist’s task will depend not only on knowing 
the relevant size, persistence, and cause of the status-quo bias, but 
also its responsiveness to the alternatives considered. Neither the 
economist nor the paternalist has adequate measures of any of these 
factors.109 
3. Endowment effects 
The size of the endowment effect clearly determines whether any 
paternalistic change in the assignment of default contractual rights 
can increase welfare. If endowment effects are weak or even 
nonexistent, then even if the paternalist selects the optimum rights 
package, no purpose is served by presuming vacation time, dismissal 
only for cause, etc., in employee contracts beyond saving on 
transaction costs. Of course, if the paternalist does not select the 
optimum rights package, transaction costs will be increased. 
Until recently, the behavioral literature accepted the existence of 
endowment effects without much controversy. Surprisingly, the 
existence of these effects has never been adequately tested. Kathryn 
Zeiler and Charles Plott have undertaken and reported experiments 
 
 108. See Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick, Optimal Defaults, supra note 106, at 183–
84; see also Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 30, at 8 (“The stronger was an individual’s 
preference for a selected alternative, the weaker was the bias.”). 
 109. Another superficially attractive possibility is to choose a default that minimizes the 
total realized costs of opting out. However, this is not a welfare-maximizing or enhancing 
standard in the presence of status-quo bias. As we have seen above, a default that motivates 
people to abandon more rapidly their suboptimal savings rate may be a good thing. This 
implies that the correct standard is the minimization of the sum of the realized costs of opting 
out and the flow losses due to too little or too much savings. In other words, higher realized 
costs of opting out would in fact be welfare enhancing if they were accompanied by a larger 
reduction in the costs of nonoptimal savings. But see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 109 
(2008) (claiming that a low rate of opting out under an automatic enrollment default is 
welfare-enhancing because it reveals that people are in a better position). Individuals could stay 
in that position simply because they have not been sufficiently motivated to choose a more 
nearly optimal savings plan, that is, because they are experiencing the very status-quo bias that 
Thaler and Sunstein view as an important cause of suboptimal savings. 
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that control for the most important factors that may be responsible 
for the appearance of endowment effects.110 When factors that could 
plausibly affect the nature of the good in question (such as whether 
it is perceived as a gift from the experimenter which could be 
impolite to exchange, or whether the endowment is really a signal of 
private information from the experimenter or perhaps other subjects) 
are eliminated, the results suggest “[e]ither no ‘endowment effect’ of 
the sort predicted by prospect theory exists [in these experiments] or 
the effect is sufficiently weak that other phenomena easily swamp 
it.”111 But notwithstanding these results, let us suppose that true 
endowment effects exist. Accurate measurement of their magnitude 
will determine the efficacy of new default rules in improving welfare. 
If the effects are small, as Zeiler and Plott suggest, then default rules 
will simply increase transaction costs for people to return to their 
favored packages. The more difficult the default is to escape, the 
greater will be the resulting loss. 
4. Hot and cold states  
To create an optimal policy justified on the basis of hot-state 
bias, such as a cooling-off period, policymakers need to know how 
much people are affected by their hot states; that is, to what extent 
their decisions are distorted. It is possible they may not be distorted 
at all. The process by which they are supposedly distorted is through 
the “empathy gap”—the tendency of individuals in a hot or excited 
emotional state to overestimate the intensity of the hedonic 
consequences of an event or good later on when the hot state has 
dissipated.112 However, hedonic consequences are not the sole, and, 
in many cases, not even the primary determinants of choice, as when 
people sacrifice personal pleasure to send their children to college or 
to pursue some form of excellence. Thus, overestimation of hedonic 
consequences may not have a significant impact on many decisions. 
 
 110. Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as 
Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007). 
This study stands out as the most rigorous attempt to date to control for confounding factors. 
See id. at 1454–56. 
 111. Id. at 1463. 
 112. See Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 365–66 (2003). It is also the case that when in a cold 
state people underestimate the intensity of feelings in a hot state. Id. 
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Furthermore, hotness and coldness refer to the state of the 
affective system. But even this is a simplification of the problem, 
because affect is not just hot or cold. Affect is an important element 
in the decision-making process; it comprises the individual’s 
motivational system—hunger, thirst, and the desire to have sex are 
just a few examples. The affective system suggests the options an 
individual must consider. Then it reduces or flags these options in 
accordance with the individual’s specific goals, time frames, and 
perhaps most importantly, his acquired knowledge of local 
circumstances.113 For example, a pleasant or unpleasant feeling may 
follow from thinking about meeting an old acquaintance or thinking 
about consuming a product with particular mental associations. 
These images are marked by a somatic state.114 So an option that is 
likely to result in such a meeting or consuming such a product may 
immediately, that is, without much deliberation, be chosen or 
discarded by the individual as a result of the somatic state. 
Consequently, a rational choice can seem, at times, as if it were 
choice without reasoning. We might see an individual jumping to 
conclusions, hastily eliminating alternatives and making decisions, 
and “wanting” things without a “sufficient” reason.115 None of this 
suggests that choices are distorted; this is the way human beings 
choose—a combination of explicit deliberation and affect. Affect is 
part of rationality. 
Of course, it is possible for the affective system to break down 
and to produce distorted choices.116 If we allow that this will happen 
in some cases, what must the policymaker know? First, he must be 
able to distinguish distortive affect from normally-functioning affect. 
As we have seen, appearances do not suffice. Second, even if the 
 
 113. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN 173, 181–83 (1994). 
 114. The body states produced by processes of the affective system necessary for rational 
decision-making may be conscious or unconscious, that is, they may or may not constitute 
feelings. Body states may be activated by stimuli but not be the focus of awareness or attention. 
Nevertheless, they can affect “cognitive processes in a covert manner and thus influence the 
reasoning and decision-making mode.” Id. at 185. 
 115. This is particularly likely in the case in which the individual himself will not 
experience a feeling of liking, hating, fearing, and so forth. He will simply approach or avoid, 
want or not want, without explicit liking or disliking. 
 116. See, e.g., Kent C. Berridge, Pleasure, Unfelt Affect, and Irrational Desire, in 
FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS: THE AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM 243, 254–59 (A.S.R. Manstead, 
N.H. Frijda & A.H. Fischer eds., 2004) (using the example of irrational choice arising from 
addictions). 
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policymaker knows that a certain type of affective state can be 
distortive, he must know to what extent it distorts in a particular 
context. Small distortions are hardly worth policy attention. Third, 
he must know something about the rate at which this particular 
distortive hot state dissipates. Cooling-off periods should be 
calibrated to this rate. A longer cooling-off period would impose 
excess costs on the sellers and then to the consumers. And, finally, he 
must know the degree to which ex post rationalization of a decision 
that cannot be changed will obviate the need for cooling-off 
periods.117 
5. Optimism and availability bias 
To create an efficient policy designed to counteract optimism 
bias, such as requiring risk narratives for risky products or 
investments, policymakers need to know both the extent of people’s 
excessive optimism (how much they underestimate the risk) and the 
extent of their availability bias (how much they respond to a 
narrative with varying levels of scariness). More excessive optimism 
points toward more and scarier narratives, greater availability bias 
toward fewer and less scary narratives. But what is the standard by 
which the paternalist’s policy will be judged? Presumably, he wants 
the two biases to balance at the point where people make the rational 
decision. It would not be sufficient to know the “correct” estimate 
of risk (and then to try to induce this perception by the appropriate 
narrative), because how much risk a person ought to bear is 
independent of neither his subjective attitude toward risk nor his 
subjective assessment of the cost of the bad outcome associated with 
it. The paternalist needs some indication of, say, the right product to 
buy or the right mutual fund in which to invest. However, if he 
knew this, then he would not need to worry about offsetting 
 
 117. Wilson and Gilbert argue that cooling-off periods might actually make people less 
satisfied with their decisions because they inhibit the process of rationalization. Timothy D. 
Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want, 14 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 133 (2005) (“When people make a decision that is difficult 
to reverse, such as buying a sweater from a store with a ‘no returns’ policy, they are strongly 
motivated to rationalize the decision and make the best of it. When people can more easily 
undo a decision, such as buying a sweater they can return, they are less motivated to rationalize 
their choice, because they can always change their minds. Consequently people are often happier 
with irrevocable choices because they do the psychological work necessary to rationalize what 
they can’t undo.” (emphasis added)). 
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optimism bias with appropriate risk narratives, because policy could 
simply command the correct outcome. 
B. Absence of a Single Measure of Bias, Even Intrapersonally 
To make matters more difficult, a single measure of any given 
bias generally does not exist, even for a single individual. Different 
degrees of bias will exist depending on the choice situation. Here we 
focus on hyperbolic discounting and hot-and-cold states. 
1. Hyperbolic discounting 
As discussed earlier, people’s actual behavior in situations of 
intertemporal choice appears to approximate hyperbolic (not quasi-
hyperbolic) discounting. This means that there is no single factor β 
that represents the agent’s degree of present-bias. Instead, the extent 
of bias depends on the distance between the two future periods 
compared and the present. 
Suppose the paternalist policymaker has (somehow) determined 
that the agent’s true preferences are best represented by some fixed 
discount factor δ. If the agent’s actual behavior approximates 
hyperbolic discounting, then the agent will discount the future too 
much when comparing periods relatively close to the present. But 
what is the extent of that bias? The answer will depend on how close 
the two periods compared are to the present. The closer they are to 
the present, the greater will be the present-bias. On the other hand, 
the agent will also discount the future too little when comparing 
periods sufficiently far from the present. This is a necessary result of 
the paternalist’s having designated a fixed discount factor δ as 
correct, when actual behavior reflects discount factors both higher 
and lower than δ. This conclusion could only be avoided by the 
paternalist having assumed the correct discount factor is the highest 
(most patient) one the agent ever exhibits. 
The implication for policy is that bias-correcting policies should 
be calibrated to the distance from the present of the intertemporal 
decisions being made. Take, for instance, a fat tax designed to curb 
junk-food consumption. The tax would need to be higher when a 
person is buying food for immediate consumption—say, at a 
restaurant or convenience store. The tax would need to be lower 
when a person is buying food for more distant consumption—say, at 
a grocery store. And depending on the policymaker’s judgment 
about the correct amount of discounting, it might even be necessary 
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to subsidize fat, rather than taxing it, for very distant consumption—
say, when planning for a celebration a year from now (like a 
wedding). Again, this follows directly from the selection of a single 
correct discount factor in the context of hyperbolic discounting. 
Even if the policymaker has selected an extremely high discount 
factor so that no subsidies are required, he still needs to make the tax 
a function of the degree of present-bias that applies to any given time 
frame, which requires the policymaker to have knowledge of that 
present-bias. 
Obviously this is impractical. In reality, the policymaker would 
most likely adopt a single tax that would apply regardless of context 
or time frame. Such a tax would yield problems of both under-
correction (the tax would be too low for decisions close to the 
present) and over-correction (the tax would be too high for 
decisions far from the present). Since any change in the tax will tend 
to produce more of one problem and less of the other, the 
policymaker will have to weigh these effects against each other to 
decide the best tax—and again, that requires having knowledge of 
the actual extent of present-bias for different time frames. 
2. Hot and cold states 
The impact of the hot-state bias on decision-making depends on 
the intensity of the relevant visceral factors.118 There are degrees of 
anger, fear, hunger, or sexual desire. It stands to reason that more 
intense emotions will distort decisions more than do less intense 
ones.119 The degree or intensity of visceral factors depends on the 
context of the decision. No decision defined in objective terms, such 
as whether to marry or buy a car, is necessarily a hot decision. 
Whether it is and whether it produces suboptimal choices “depends 
on a wide range of influences.”120 These include “how recently a 
drive was satisfied and on the presence of arousing stimuli” as well as 
“the interaction of situational factors and construal processes and on 
internal psychobiological factors.”121 Although some types of 
decisions are no doubt more likely to be affected by visceral states, 
 
 118. George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 273 (1996). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 281. 
 121. Id. 
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there will be significant intra-individual variation depending on the 
particular context. As a result, waiting periods for decisions to take 
effect or options to allow people to revoke prior decisions will have 
different consequences as the context varies. The net consequences 
may be costly in some circumstances and beneficial in others.122 
Whether a general rule, even adapted to particular types of situations, 
is beneficial overall requires knowledge of the relative frequency of 
the relevant contextual factors—knowledge no one has. 
Furthermore, the presumably different rates of hot-state dissipation 
(derived from the differential presence of contextual factors) will also 
determine the optimal length of the cooling-off period.123 
VIII. ACCOUNTING FOR SELF-DEBIASING 
People have numerous means at their disposal to mitigate the 
effects of their own biases. We will refer to these methods as “self-
debiasing” or “self-regulation.” We do not claim, however, that self-
regulation effectively eliminates all or even most biases. Our 
argument is rather that the existence of such methods implies that 
some paternalistic policies that appear desirable at first blush are 
either unnecessary or in need of softening (lower sin taxes, shorter 
cooling-off periods, etc.) to account for the extent to which the 
biases have already been addressed privately. Policy measures that do 
not take account of self-debiasing can move the individual even 
farther away from his optimal decision than he would be in the 
absence of such policies. 
A. The Many Varieties of Self-Debiasing and Self-Regulation 
The most obvious form of self-regulation is simply the exertion 
of willpower. But in an important sense, willpower comes into play 
too late. When the individual is already exposed to a temptation, 
direct resistance can be very costly. Individuals, however, are more 
inventive about the methods they choose to achieve their long-run 
 
 122. In those cases in which the distortive aspect of hot decisions is small, the delay or 
option-to-revoke costs will outweigh the benefits. 
 123. Sometimes the hot state is caused by contemplation of the decision itself such as 
those relative to death, disease, accidents, and terrorism. Therefore, the hot state will not 
dissipate so long as the decision is ultimately made. In these cases neither delay nor option-to-
revoke seems to have any paternalistic benefits. So the net result of having such cooling-off 
periods is costly. See Jeffrey A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 
61–62 (2007). 
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objectives. Self-regulation “consists of a wide range of cognitive and 
motivational operations, such as acting quickly to take opportunities, 
ignoring distractions, acting flexibly in response to situations, 
overcoming obstacles, and managing conflicts between goals.”124 
More specifically, self-regulation functions to reduce the impact of 
behavioral biases by using strategies that are cognitive, 
environmental, and directly behavioral.125 Cognitive strategies 
include focusing on the benefits of reaching one’s goal, distracting 
oneself from undesirable behavior by using imagery of better 
alternatives, and using self-praise to commend oneself for achieving 
an important goal.126 Environmental strategies include avoiding 
people, situations, settings, and even times of day when temptations 
are strong.127 Directly-behavioral strategies include increasing social 
support, utilizing cues about one’s important goals, rewarding 
oneself for desirable behavior or punishing oneself for undesirable 
behavior, and creating ways to make desirable behavior itself more 
enjoyable.128 
The following is a partial list of debiasing strategies in each 
general category. The large variety of these strategies and their 
connection to particular circumstances of time and place should 
make obvious the scope of the difficulties paternalists face in trying 
to account for them in the determination of welfare-enhancing 
policies. 
1. Cognitive strategies 
a. Resolutions and commitments. These mental devices focus a 
person’s attention on those situations and choices in which his own 
biases are most likely to be manifested. A person who suffers from 
weakness of will when it comes to eating might make a resolution 
never to eat desserts except on special occasions. A person with a 
 
 124. Gráinne M. Fitzsimons & John A. Bargh, Automatic Self-Regulation, in 
HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 151, 151–52 
(Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2004) (citing P.M. Gollwitzer & G.B. 
Moskowitz, Goal Effects on Action and Cognition, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF 
BASIC PRINCIPLES 361, 368 (E.T. Higgins & A.W. Kruglanski eds., 1996)). 
 125. For a list of self-regulatory strategies, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 
Self-Control Strategies, http://www.minddisorders.com/Py-Z/Self-control-strategies.html. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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marked tendency to make rash decisions in hot emotional states—
say, when confronted with the opportunity to commit adultery—
might resolve to physically remove himself from the situation before 
making any decision or to count slowly to ten before taking any 
action. 
b. Mental accounts and budgets. As a means of setting boundaries 
and reminding themselves of their resolutions, people sometimes 
adopt mental accounting devices to keep certain behaviors within 
limits.129 For instance, a person might establish an entertainment 
budget; he allows himself to spend as much as he likes on 
entertainment up to a chosen limit, but will not let himself exceed it. 
Or he might establish a fund for household expenses that cannot be 
tapped for other purposes. Mental budgets can enable indulgence as 
well as limit it, such as when someone commits himself to take a 
vacation (perhaps to overcome a tendency toward overworking). 
2. Environmental strategies 
a. Submission to social controls. These are efforts to enlist 
outsiders to assist in the keeping of one’s commitments. Someone 
trying to quit smoking may advertise that intention to friends and 
family, so they will remind him of his commitment and frown on 
deviations from it. Formal organizations like Alcoholics Anonymous 
and Weight Watchers play the same role, providing a support 
network that lowers the cost of following commitments and raises 
the cost of breaking them. Strotz provides the more extreme 
examples of getting married “for the sake of ‘settling down’” or 
joining the army as methods of precommitting financial or economic 
actions.130 
b. Self-constraining devices. These devices structure the external 
environment to raise the cost of some activities and lower the cost of 
others. People trying to quit smoking sometimes throw away their 
cigarettes to remove the temptation. People with eating problems 
may refuse to allow especially tempting foods in their home. People 
who have difficulty saving can opt to have automatic monthly 
 
 129. That people use mental budgeting to control their behavior is well established. See, 
e.g., Chip Heath & Jack B. Soll, Mental Budgeting and Consumer Decisions, 23 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 40 (1996); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 
199 (1985); Klaus Wertenbroch, Consumption Self-Control by Rationing Purchase Quantities of 
Virtues and Vice, 17 MARKETING SCI. 317 (1998). 
 130. Strotz, supra note 25, at 173. 
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transfers from their checking accounts to their savings accounts. 
Gamblers can limit their opportunities to exceed self-imposed limits 
by leaving their credit and ATM cards at home. 
3. Directly-behavioral strategies  
a. Internal rewards and punishments. It is not uncommon for 
people to affect their choices by means of internally imposed 
incentive schemes, by which they give themselves rewards for more 
favored behavior and punishments for less favored behavior. For 
example, someone trying to lose weight might reward herself for 
meeting weight-loss goals with permission to go to a movie or buy 
another music CD. The phenomenon of self-gifting has been 
documented in a series of papers,131 and the efficacy of self-reward 
schemes in motivating greater effort and performance has also been 
shown.132  
B. The Significance of Context for Self-Regulation 
Consideration of the various methods used by real people to 
regulate their own behavior reveals the overriding importance of 
context.133 Resolutions, commitments, mental budgets, and internal 
rewards and punishments typically depend for their application on 
specific features of time and place: what time of day it is; whether 
one is at work, at home, or on vacation; whether the present 
situation is a special occasion like a birthday or wedding; and so on. 
 
 131. See David Glen Mick, Self-Gifts, in GIFT-GIVING: A RESEARCH ANTHOLOGY 99 
(Cele Otnes & Richard F. Beltramini eds., 1996); David Glen Mick & Michelle DeMoss, Self-
Gifts: Phenomenological Insights from Four Contexts, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 322 (1990). 
 132. See Albert Bandura & Dale H. Schunk, Cultivating Competence, Self-Efficacy and 
Intrinsic Interest through Proximal Self-Motivation, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 586, 
586–87, 595–97 (1981); Albert Bandura & Bernard Perloff, Relative Efficacy of Self-Monitored 
and Externally Imposed Reinforcement Systems, 7 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 111, 
114–116 (1967). 
 133. All actions derive their meaning from context. Consider the simple act of an 
individual touching his nose with a finger. The meaning changes with the context in which it 
takes place. If the individual is being asked to touch his nose as part of an experiment, the 
purpose of which is unknown to him, then he may see the act as simply obeying the 
instructions for the sake of science or for some payment. If it is a part of a neurological exam, 
then the context is the health of the individual or the diagnosis of a possible disease. 
Alternatively, it may simply be scratching an itch or swatting a fly. Or it may be a socially-
recognized gesture of disapproval. Context determines meaning. For a detailed analysis, see 
Shaun Gallagher & Anthony J. Marcel, The Self in Contextualized Action, 6 J. 
CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 4 (1999). 
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Self-constraining devices and submission to social controls are 
devices designed to affect one’s context by inserting costs, benefits, 
barriers, and reminders that would not otherwise be present. 
1. Self-regulation in the laboratory versus in the wild 
As has been said, the existence of self-debiasing measures does 
not mean that all biases are perfectly corrected. Individuals may not 
know all of their biases, and the methods they adopt may not 
succeed—or may succeed too well, as in the case of anorexics or 
tightwads. The point is that any debiasing policy will only be 
successful to the extent that it takes self-debiasing efforts into 
account. Measuring the extent of bias absent self-debiasing efforts 
will overstate the degree of bias realized in behavior, and hence the 
amount of correction required. Without a clear and realististic 
context, laboratory measurement of self-regulation or control will 
not capture this. 
To see why this should matter to the paternalist policymaker, let 
us take the case of an individual who faces future consequences to be 
balanced against current costs or benefits. His actual rate of 
impatience is greater, we assume, than what would be dictated by his 
“true” preferences.134 Let us suppose, charitably, that the 
policymaker already knows the individual’s true time preference, as 
well as the unmodified extent of his present-bias (that is, excessive 
impatience). Nevertheless, he still needs to know the degree to 
which the individual’s self-regulatory mechanisms counteract his own 
impatience. This would give the policymaker an effective or 
operational level of present-bias, which will—if the person’s self-
regulation works at all—differ from his unmodified present-bias. This 
 
 134. Not all self-regulation or “self-control” problems are impatience problems. There 
can be a negative difference between the actual rate and the normative rate. See, e.g., John 
Ameriks, Andrew Caplin, John Leahy & Tom Tyler, Measuring Self-Control 1 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10514, 2004) (“The current view of self-control 
problems as involving the need to suppress the immediate urge to consume is inadequate. In 
our sample, ‘present-bias’ (the urge to consume today more than would be ideal) is no more 
prevalent than is ‘future-bias’ (a tendency to consume less today than would be ideal) . . . .”). 
The individual can have “excessive patience,” as when he operates under the comforting 
illusion that he will not die or grow infirm or be less capable over time of enjoying physical 
activity. See Wojcieh Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Denial of Death and Economic Behavior, 5 
ADVANCES THEORETICAL ECON., Jan. 2005, art. 5, at 2–4, available at http://www. 
bepress.com/bejte/advances/vol5/iss1/art5. We ignore this here for purely heuristic reasons, 
but caution that this hyperopia can complicate policymakers’ decisions. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009 10:03 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
948 
knowledge is necessary to determine, for example, the rate of 
taxation on present benefits that will lower the effective rate of 
impatience to the correct level. 
To solve the problem, the paternalist needs to measure the 
amount of self-debiasing that occurs, but doing so is inherently 
problematic. Much of our evidence of decision-making biases derives 
from laboratory experiments. But laboratory experiments cannot 
capture all debiasing efforts, because self-debiasing efforts are 
context-dependent: the person with a weight problem resists desserts 
except on special occasions, the person trying to save more money 
signs up for automatic deductions from paychecks (but not 
unexpected windfalls), etc. Lab environments, on the other hand, are 
typically devoid of context. Even if the experiment designer 
deliberately structures the experiment to create the illusion of 
context, this effort cannot capture self-debiasing efforts that seek to 
achieve overall outcomes by differing across contexts. What may 
appear to be a bias in a particular context could be part of an overall 
plan that creates a deliberate exception in that area. The strategy of 
eating dessert only on special occasions, for example, rations fat 
consumption by defining narrow contexts in which it is allowed. A 
lab environment can duplicate one context, but not all the contexts 
relevant to the individual’s overall strategy. 
The context may be inferred by external observers of situations 
when observing human behavior “in the wild,” or it may be supplied 
by the observers in experimental situations. The main question for us 
is whether the context supplied by observers or inferred by subjects 
in an experiment is equivalent to the context of the real-world 
situations to which the results of these experiments are 
generalized.135 Thus, if an individual is asked as part of an experiment 
whether he prefers a larger, later reward as opposed to an earlier, 
smaller one over various intervals of time, he may or may not display 
a range of time-discounting propensities that reflect his real-world 
 
 135. The equivalence of context has implications for both problem construal (“What am 
I being asked to do?”) and for the nature of the solution (“How should I behave?”). See, e.g., 
Glenn W. Harrison & E. Elisabet Rutström, Doing It Both Ways—Experimental Practice and 
Heuristic Context, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 413, 413–14 (2001) (“Field referents can often 
help subjects overcome confusion about the task. . . . [Even] [i]n cases where the subject 
understands all the relevant aspects of the abstract game, problems may arise due to the 
triggering of different methods for solving the decision problem. The use of field referents 
could trigger the use of specific heuristics from the field to solve the specific problem in the 
lab, which otherwise may have been solved less efficiently . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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behavior. This will depend on the degree of similarity in context 
between the experiment and the wild. 
Thus, self-regulation is context-dependent. The drive for 
generality in experiments, on the other hand, usually produces 
minimal or antiseptic context such as designating some actors as 
buyers or sellers, determining the set of alternatives, and ordering 
their presentation.136 The experimenters may worry that providing 
“too much” context limits the applicability of results to the real 
world. But precisely the opposite is the case if the purpose is to 
inform paternalist policy. To capture the real world of choice, we 
must see choices in their self-regulatory context. There is no such 
thing as general or abstract self-regulation137—although the 
contextual nature of self-regulation is obscured by the popular idea 
that it is derived from some homogeneous source such as inner 
strength or willpower.138 Thinking in this way is apt simply to result 
in measuring choice propensities in under-defined contexts. 
2. The automaticity of unconscious self-regulation 
There is important and growing evidence suggesting that 
“conscious processes are neither necessary or even typical for 
effective self-regulation . . . .”139 Much self-regulation must be non-
conscious to be effective in view of the limited capacity of individuals 
to deal with a complex and rapidly-changing environment in a fully 
deliberative manner.140 There are, for example, unconscious 
processes associated with selective attention, that is, the focusing on 
 
 136. See George Loewenstein, Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of 
Behavioural Economics, ECON. J., Feb. 1999, at F25, F29 (1999) (“Many experimental 
economists seem to view their enterprise as akin to silicon chip production. Subjects are 
removed from all familiar contextual cues. . . . [B]uyers and sellers become ‘persons A and B,’ 
and all other information that might make the situation familiar and provide a clue about how 
to behave is removed.”). 
 137. It is possible to make an even broader claim. See id. at F30 (“A major discovery of 
cognitive psychology is the degree to which all forms of thinking and problem solving are 
context-dependent . . . .”). 
 138. This does not seem to be the case (or, at least, the metaphor does not seem 
appropriate) since there are intrapersonal differences across self-regulatory tasks and various 
situations. See Daniel Cervone, People Who Fail at Self-Regulation: What Should We Think of 
Them—and How?, 7 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 40, 41 (1996). 
 139. Fitzsimons & Bargh, supra note 124, at 151 (providing a partial survey of the 
relevant literature). 
 140. Id. at 152. 
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important or superordinate goals.141 There is also unconscious 
modulation of emotional states that might threaten the attainment of 
these goals.142 And subliminally activated goals have been shown to 
“guide behavior in a purposive, though nonconscious, 
manner . . . .”143 These unconscious processes are triggered by the 
local and personal circumstances of the individual, that is, by his self-
regulatory context, to an even greater extent than the conscious 
processes discussed above.144 For example, simply thinking about 
people with whom one has a relationship, such as family, friends, and 
colleagues, can automatically “activate goals that guide and regulate 
the self’s actions in a given situation . . . .”145 These goals are 
generally those congruent with the attitudes of the others.146 
Social norms relevant to the particular environment in which the 
individual acts are also sources of automatic processes.147 Most 
interestingly, an automatic form of self-control known as 
“counteractive self-control” can be triggered by imagining the 
temptation. This is a proactive or ex ante adjustment of the relevant 
choice variables.148 Counteractive self-control may involve changing 
the “objective” choice situation by self-imposing a penalty for the 
failure to achieve one’s long-term goal.149 Additionally, it may 
change the psychological meaning of the choice situation by raising 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. The existence of mood regulation tends to counteract “irrational” pressures on 
decision-making when the stakes are high. See Ralph Erber, Maureen Wang Erber & Jennifer 
Poe, Mood Regulation and Decision-Making: Is Irrational Exuberance Really a Problem?, in 2 
PSYCHOLOGY  OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: REASONS & CHOICES 197, 204–05 (Isabelle Brocas 
& Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003). 
 143. Fitzsimons & Bargh, supra note 124, at 153–55 (citation omitted). 
 144. See id. at 156–57 (discussing how social environment and personal relationships can 
affect unconscious self regulation). 
 145. Id. at 157 (citations omitted). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 156. 
 148. Thus, counteractive self-control is not dissonance reduction. See Ayelet Fishbach & 
Yaacov Trope, The Substitutability of External Control and Self-Control, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 256, 259 (2005) (“CCT [Counteractive Control Theory] concerns proactive 
attempts to enact what one ideally prefers, whereas dissonance concerns attempts to reduce the 
discomfort produced by having failed to enact what one prefers.”). 
 149. See id. 
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the subjective value of the long-term goals and decreasing the 
subjective aversion of the short-term costs.150 
Unconscious self-regulation is not easily observable. The target 
agent himself is unaware of its operation. It may take quite subtle 
forms, as we have seen above. For the new paternalist, accounting for 
this type of self-regulation is thus particularly difficult. 
IX. ACCOUNTING FOR INTERDEPENDENT BIASES 
The simultaneous existence of more than one bias affecting the 
individual’s cognition or behavior poses a difficult problem for policy 
choices grounded in the new paternalism.151 Almost universally, in 
the current state of research, only one bias at a time is studied.152 But 
since we have good reason to believe that simultaneous biases are 
likely, merely finding a bias that is significant both statistically and in 
size is not sufficient to conclude that the associated behavior is 
suboptimal.153 
The identification of myriad cognitive and behavioral biases 
across hundreds of studies, as well as sometimes the identification of 
more than one bias within a single study, is good prima facie 
evidence that individuals are subject to multiple biases. Joachim 
Krueger and David Funder present a “partial list” of forty-two 
cognitive biases, including numerous opposite or contradictory 
biases, discovered in the social psychology literature since 1985.154 
The likelihood of multiple biases in individual behavior and 
cognition has both a qualitative and a quantitative impact on optimal 
policy. 
 
 150. For a survey of results, see Yaacov Trope & Ayelet Fishbach, Going Beyond the 
Motivation Given: Self-Control and Situation Control over Behavior, in THE NEW 
UNCONSCIOUS 537, 537–51 (Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 2005). 
 151. This problem should be distinguished from those arising from the existence of 
multiple biases within a population. We do not deal with this here. 
 152. See Hanming Fang & Dan Silverman, Distinguishing Between Cognitive Biases, in 
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 47, 48 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (“So 
far, both the theoretical and the empirical studies in economics have tended to investigate the 
implications of cognitive biases and heuristics one bias at a time . . . .”). 
 153. See generally Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerations in Correcting Cognitive 
Biases, 71 S. ECON. J. 12 (2004). 
 154. See Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a Balanced Social Psychology: 
Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and 
Cognition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 313, 317 tbl.1 (2004). 
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A. Qualitative Effects 
In this section we follow the analysis of Hanming Fang and Dan 
Silverman in showing that multiple biases working in the same 
quantitative direction have different implications for policy.155 
Suppose we were to design an optimal welfare policy that is 
paternalistic in the sense that it is best from the point of view of 
single mothers on welfare (rather than from the point of view of 
taxpayers). Suppose further, as is likely, that single welfare mothers 
have both excessive impatience and projection bias. In other words, 
they discount too heavily the delayed benefits of work—higher 
income and greater self-respect—relative to the immediate benefits 
of welfare, and they also overestimate the utility costs of work 
because they fail to predict their adaptation to working and, thus, its 
reduced irksomeness. These biases move in the same direction 
insofar as they reinforce the mother’s desire to stay on welfare. 
Nevertheless, the logic of each bias is different and thus behavior will 
be differently affected. Present bias may be offset by inducing large 
and abrupt increases in the relative return to work through such 
policies as strict welfare time limits or immediate subsidization of 
work. This will circumvent the excessive discounting of future 
rewards. On the other hand, projection bias may be overcome by 
gently and slowly accommodating the transition to work through 
policies of gradual acquisition of human capital and exposure to 
work environments so that the individual’s preferences may more 
easily adapt to labor force participation. In order to determine which 
policy is best, the paternalist must have some idea of which bias is 
more important in the determination of behavior. Too much of one 
or the other policy can worsen the well-being of the single welfare 
mothers relative to their true, undistorted preferences. Abrupt 
policies might too quickly throw them off welfare when they are not 
adequately prepared in terms of human capital or acclamation to 
work. Gradual policies might keep them on welfare past the point 
where they would benefit from working.  
At the present time, however, we do not know whether it will be 
possible to disentangle the magnitude of the biases from available 
 
 155. See Fang & Silverman, supra note 152, at 57. 
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data, even assuming that the two biases have been identified.156 
Moreover, it is not sufficient simply to try various policies and to 
endorse any policy that reduces welfare rolls. From a paternalist 
perspective, the goal is not simply to reduce welfare, but to reduce it 
optimally with respect to the single mothers’ true preferences. Yet in 
the absence of knowledge of the complex interaction of the relevant 
biases, the appropriate policy prescriptions congruent with these 
preferences cannot be known. 
B. Quantitative Effects 
Behavior that seems suboptimal from the perspective of the 
measured bias may, in fact, be optimal when all of the biases are 
measured.157 Even if it is suboptimal, it may not be suboptimal in the 
direction of the single measured bias. For example, even if 
individuals somewhat excessively discount the future costs of 
smoking, they may still smoke too little—in terms of their own long-
run preferences—if they overestimate, perhaps due to availability 
bias, the health risks of smoking.158 Identification of the former bias 
alone might lead the analyst to the conclusion that they smoke too 
much. Similarly, excessively impatient individuals may nevertheless 
save too much for retirement if they suffer from projection bias in 
assuming that future consumption tastes will be the same as at 
present, or if they do not accept the inevitability of death.159 In the 
general case, the existence of multiple biases will make it difficult to 
determine the extent and direction of suboptimal behavior. To see 
this more clearly, consider the following examples.160 Suppose an 
individual is subject to three biases: excessive impatience in the form 
 
 156. See id. at 74 (“Moreover, we do not know yet, if the true generating process is a 
model with a combination of present and projection biases, whether we will be able to 
disentangle the magnitude of these biases from standard data.”). 
 157. By “optimal,” we mean here the most welfare-enhancing behavior given the 
existence of biases. This is second-best optimality. See generally Besharov, supra note 153. 
 158. On the possible overestimation of the health risks of smoking, see generally 
Fernando Antoñanzas et al., Smoking Risks in Spain: Part I—Perception of Risks to the Smoker, 
21 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 161 (2000). 
 159. On the effect of projection bias on saving, see Fang & Silverman, supra note 152, at 
56. On the savings-and-consumption effects of the denial of death, see Kopczuk & Slemrod, 
supra note 134, at 4 (“Our model of death anxiety and the possible repression of information 
about mortality implies that people who are unaware of their denial will underconsume, acting 
as if their expected lifetime is longer than is accurate.”). 
 160. These examples are taken from Besharov, supra note 153, at 18–19. 
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of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, overconfidence about the favorable 
results of his actions, and ex post regret when he does not undertake 
sufficient effort to accomplish his goals. He is faced with a decision 
about a project that requires effort (costs) now and yields benefits in 
the immediate future. Excessive impatience tends to reduce his 
effort; overconfidence bias and regret bias tend to increase his effort.  
Assume the paternalist knows the magnitude of just one bias, say, 
the overconfidence bias. He will then likely conclude that the 
individual’s effort is above the optimum; and yet, due to the 
operation of the unobserved excessive impatience bias, it may 
actually be below the optimum. Paternalistic efforts to counter the 
overconfidence bias will thus exacerbate the suboptimal provision of 
effort. 
Now assume that the paternalist knows the magnitude of all of 
the relevant biases. Yet the paternalist will not be able to determine 
the optimum level of effort toward attaining the agent’s goal if he 
does not know both the value of the effort (imputed from the value 
of the goal) and the costs of effort. Since the biases are measured in 
different units, their impact on effort cannot be determined without 
knowledge of how much effort will be provided at various levels of 
the biases. Therefore effective debiasing would require a great deal of 
knowledge—so much so that a paternalist who possessed this would 
have to be near-omniscient. 
Finally, assume that the paternalist knows the magnitude of all 
the biases, as well as the optimum level of effort, but not the 
individual’s costs of correcting the separate biases. Presumably an 
individual who was aware of his biases would incur costs such that 
the usual condition of marginal cost equals marginal benefit is 
satisfied. In this correction equilibrium each bias may be treated 
differently—some may be reduced a good deal, some reduced just a 
little, and others may not change at all. Since the biases are 
interrelated, there may be second-best adjustments relative to those 
that cannot be cost-effectively changed. Whether these biases have 
already been optimally corrected will be hard to determine. 
These examples make clear that even partial knowledge of a 
rather extensive nature is not sufficient to ensure welfare-enhancing 
paternalistic intervention. Clearly, to have all of the knowledge 
required, as even this simple model reveals, is out of the question. 
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X. ANTICIPATING UNRAVELING OF SELF-REGULATION AND THE 
SPREAD OF BIASES 
A. Substitution Effects Between Internal and External Debiasing 
Roughly speaking, there are two ways to solve a self-control 
problem: internally (through one’s own efforts), or externally 
(through the efforts of third parties).161 When the environment in 
which an individual makes his decisions is characterized by significant 
external control, the degree of self-control exercised will be lower. In 
other words, there is substitutability between external control and 
self-control.162 
In the first instance, we can think of external control as purely 
social influence or pressure. For example, “individuals sometime 
criticize their friends or family members for eating unhealthy food or 
excessively watching TV.”163 Going one step beyond this, but still 
without legal coercion, “[s]ocial partners, groups and organizations 
may institute incentives, sanctions and rules that are designed to help 
individuals overcome temptations.”164 These factors are part of the 
local context that determines the degree of (counteractive) self-
control exercised by individuals. 
For example, students who were asked to take a “diagnostic test 
of their reading skills” exercised varying levels of self-control 
depending on whether they were exposed to external pressure. When 
the test was characterized as boring and the students were not 
subjected to any external control or pressure, they exercised 
counteractive self-control by increasing their ex ante perception of 
the test’s value.165 Students that were asked to take the same test, 
characterized as interesting, on the other hand, did not exercise this 
self-control and, therefore, had a relatively lower ex ante evaluation 
of the test.166 
The exercise of counteractive self-control to convince oneself to 
take a boring test, however, appeared to break down when the 
students were subjected to external pressure. 167 Subjects that were 
 
 161. See Fishbach & Trope, supra note 148, at 256–59. 
 162. See id. at 260–61. 
 163. Id. at 256. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 260–61. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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asked to decide whether to take the boring test in the presence of the 
experimenter did not increase their evaluation of the test. 168 Rather, 
they decided to take the test as a result of the social pressure from 
experimenter-monitoring (external control) of the decision 
process.169 
Thus, counteractive self-control and external control behaved as 
substitutes in influencing the subjects’ decisions to take a boring 
test.170 Similarly, when students were asked to evaluate studying (an 
activity with short-run costs and long-run benefits), counteractive 
self-control and external control in the form of parental expectations 
were substitutes in overcoming the temptations of interfering 
activities like watching TV.171 
We conclude from the above that self-control strategies and 
external control are interrelated. Individuals will adjust at their own 
margins depending on the exogenous context. Therefore, much of 
the experimental evidence showing self-control failures must be 
interpreted cautiously because looking at self-control alone does not 
give a complete picture. To be effective, policies designed to 
supplement deficient self-control with some form of paternalistic 
regulation must take account of the existing sources of external 
control. It may be that existing external pressures already maximally 
supplement the natural urge to exercise self-control—further external 
pressure might actually decrease the average person’s predisposition 
to control herself or himself. 
However, the policymaker’s problem does not stop there, as 
policy itself might change important variables. While there do not 
seem to be direct studies of this problem, there is some suggestive 
research. Consider a study in which students were offered a “highly 
valuable” diagnostic test of their nighttime cognitive abilities.172 The 
test would be administered either at 9:00 PM or at the more 
inconvenient time of 1:00 AM. Half the students would be given a 
payment of twenty dollars to take the test while the other half would 
not receive any payment.173 This is analogous to a government 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 261–63. 
 172. See id. at 263–66. Many students stay up late at night trying to study and so they are 
interested in this. 
 173. Id. 
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subsidy. (A policymaker who wanted to help people overcome short-
run costs might subsidize the target activity.) The results are similar 
to those in the previously-mentioned studies. Those who were not 
offered the subsidy exercised counteractive self-control by increasing 
their evaluation of the test’s importance.174 Those who were offered 
the subsidy did not exercise self-control.175 Thus there is another 
class of effects to consider. When external control in the form of 
payment is imposed, counteractive self-control decreases. Policy will 
itself change the level of self-control on which optimal policy 
depends.176 
To summarize: policymakers who wish optimally to counteract 
deficient self-control need to know the amount of self-control that is 
being exercised under the status-quo. To know this, they must know 
the social-pressure context of the class of target decisions. As we have 
seen, most experiments are bad at replicating contexts in the wild.177 
If we let this problem pass, however, the policymaker still must know 
to what extent imposition of legal external controls will alter the 
status-quo of self-control as the context changes to one of more 
external control. We do not now have adequate information on the 
degree of substitutability between various types of external control 
and counteractive self-control to know whether particular policies 
will worsen or ameliorate the initial perceived deficiency of self-
control. 
B. Generalized Reduction of Self-Regulation 
Many psychologists believe that the capacity for internal control 
is a scarce resource subject to depletion.178 If individuals have 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Economists will no doubt prefer models in which there is a social optimum and an 
equilibrium level of a subsidy (tax) corresponding to an equilibrium level of self-control. 
Assuming such a model were applicable, a policymaker who knew the socially optimal subsidy 
could simply impose it, and the socially optimal level of self-control would be generated. The 
reality of policy is, however, far more messy. If a subsidy is imposed and people respond by 
reducing self-control, then arguments will be made for increasing the subsidy and expanding 
the degree of paternalistic intervention. Since no one is likely to know the optimal level of self-
control, the process might simply continue until the subsidy replaced self-control entirely. 
 177.  See supra Part VII.B.1. 
 178. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister et al., Self-Regulation and Personality: How Interventions 
Increase Regulatory Success, and How Depletion Moderates the Effects of Traits on Behavior, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY 1773, 1773–76 (2006). 
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previously exercised self-control, immediate subsequent efforts at 
self-control will be less successful.179 Thus when individuals exercised 
some self-regulatory effort in an initial task, they were then more 
likely to “spend money impulsively . . . [,] show higher levels of 
aggressive responding . . . [,] drink more alcohol even when 
anticipating a driving test . . . [,] [and] perform inappropriate or 
uncontrolled sexual behaviours . . . [,]’’ as well as engage in a wide-
range of other low self-regulation activities.180 All of this is consistent 
with a short-run fixed supply of self-regulation. 
If, as we have previously argued, external control substitutes for 
self-control, and if self-control is a limited resource, then, plausibly, 
an increase of external control might release some self-control 
capacity for other tasks from which it had been missing. In other 
words, any loss in self-control occasioned by the adoption of 
paternalist policies in one area of life might be offset by increases in 
self-control for other areas of life. 
In the longer run, however, lack of exercise of self-control 
capacity leads to a decline of that capacity.181 In other words, 
although the supply of self-control is fixed in the short run, it is not 
in the long run.182 The capacity for self-control can be augmented in 
the long run by its exercise in the short run. To put the issue in 
metaphorical terms, self-control is more like a fund in the short-run, 
but more like a muscle in the long run. In the short run, you can run 
out of self-control; in the long run, exercise can augment your self-
control. 
Consider the following representative experiment. Researchers 
assessed the motivation of people to avoid the expression or 
appearance of prejudice toward homosexuals and obese people.183 
Consistent with previous findings, some people were highly 
motivated and others were minimally motivated to avoid 
prejudice.184 Participants were then asked to write about a day in the 
life of a hypothetical homosexual or obese person without resorting 
 
 179. Id. at 1776. 
 180. Id. (citations omitted). 
 181. Id. at 1779–86. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Increasing Self-Regulatory Strength Can Reduce 
the Depleting Effects of Suppressing Stereotypes, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 281, 
283–86 (2007). 
 184. Id. 
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to stereotypes.185 In effect, they had to use, to a greater or lesser 
extent, self-regulatory capacity to suppress the stereotypes. 
Afterwards, in another task, the same individuals were asked to solve 
anagrams.186 This required the further exercise of self-regulation. In 
general, people performed worse on the second task.187 The worst 
performance, however, was from those who had displayed, in the 
first task, low self-regulatory traits in avoiding prejudice.188 For them 
the cost of the initial suppression task was high and, in the short run, 
greatly depleted their self-regulatory capacity. 
To capture longer-run effects, participants were asked to practice 
self-regulatory activity, unrelated to stereotype suppression, for two 
weeks.189 Then participants were retested to determine the degree to 
which the primary self-regulatory activity—suppressing stereotypes—
depleted capacity with respect to subsequent self-regulation.190 The 
important finding is that the two weeks of unrelated exercise of self-
control increased the performance on the second task.191 Thus, 
practice in the short run increased self-regulatory capacity in the 
longer run. Furthermore, this increase was seen only in the 
individuals who had a low propensity to avoid prejudice, that is, only 
in those who had an initially high cost of suppressing stereotypes.192 
The first conclusion we draw is that policies that decrease the 
exercise of self-regulation in the short run will decrease the amount 
of self-regulatory capacity in the longer run. Secondly, this decrease 
will manifest itself in areas unrelated to the initial decrease in self-
regulation. For example, lesser (or greater) self-management in 
financial affairs can affect self-regulation in the same direction in the 
areas of diet, smoking, and alcohol consumption.193 The third 
conclusion is that individuals with initial high costs of self-regulation 
benefit more from exercise of short-run self-control than others. Or, 
to put things negatively, those who have a high cost of self-
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 286. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 286–88. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See generally Megan Oaten & Ken Cheng, Improvements in Self-control from 
Financial Monitoring, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 487 (2007). 
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regulation have the most to lose from the short-run substitution of 
external for internal control. 
How do these conclusions affect the paternalist policymaker’s 
problem? He must recognize that supplementing self-control with 
external control in a particular area will, in the longer run, lead to 
the decrease in self-regulatory capacity and the spread of deficient 
self-control to other, unrelated areas. This will reduce or perhaps 
negate completely the benefits of a paternalistic intervention. But it 
will not do this uniformly. The effect will be greater the larger the 
initial costs of self-control. All of these effects are difficult to account 
for, because the contextual nature of self-regulation means these 
effects are contingent on local facts. As we saw in the last section, the 
degree to which greater external regulation will crowd out short-run 
self-control will depend on the relative efficacy of each. Now we see 
that the degree to which reduced short-run self-control will result in 
lower long-run self-control, and the areas to which it will spread will 
depend on initial self-control propensities in particular areas. Once 
again, the local knowledge issues threaten the facile policy use of the 
generalizations from behavioral economics. 
XI. ACCOUNTING FOR HETEROGENEITY: THE ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL 
PROBLEM 
Knowing that a bias exists is not enough. Knowing the extent of 
bias for a particular individual, or for the typical individual, is also 
not enough. For the paternalist to construct effective policies, the 
paternalist must also take into account the heterogeneity of 
individuals in their decision-making biases. 
A. Problems of Over-Inclusion and Under-Inclusion 
Most, if not all, proposed policies have a “one-size-fits-all” 
flavor, in that they cannot be targeted at specific individuals. As a 
result, most policies will tend to create problems of both under- and 
over-inclusion, meaning that some people whose behavior needs 
correction will not be affected enough, while other people whose 
behavior requires less change (or no change at all) will be affected 
too much. A fat tax, for instance, would apply to all buyers of food. 
Some overeaters will continue to eat too much because the fat tax is 
insufficiently large (or because they are indifferent to the tax), while 
some non-overeaters will be induced to reduce their consumption 
unnecessarily, with a resulting reduction in satisfaction. Whether the 
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gains from those helped exceed the losses to those harmed by a 
policy depends crucially on the distribution of the extent of bias 
across the affected population—which means the paternalist 
policymaker needs extensive information about that distribution. (It 
will also depend crucially on making interpersonal comparisons of 
utility, a problematic matter in and of itself.) Policymakers could, of 
course, try to create special exemptions (total or partial) for those 
deemed not to require special assistance in correcting their biases. 
But a finely tuned policy of this nature would require a great deal of 
information in order to identify which individuals to grant 
exceptions (and to what extent). 
There is abundant evidence that both behavioral and cognitive 
biases are not uniform.194 They are distributed in the population 
along such parameters as performance on the Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (possibly a measure of general cognitive ability),195 cognitive 
mindsets or dispositions,196 cultural differences,197 and gender 
differences.198 Affective changes within a single individual as well as, 
possibly, developmental changes can also affect the existence or 
degree of biases.199 All of this will complicate the determination of 
optimal policy where, as we see below, policy cannot be tailored 
according to the individual’s characteristics. Additionally, and 
perhaps most importantly for policy prescriptions, individuals may 
differ substantially in their behavior from situation to situation.200 
This implies that measured biases in one area will be inaccurate if 
applied to other areas, and thus optimal policy will be different 
according to, for example, whether we are dealing with junk food 
consumption or savings behavior.201 
 
 194. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Assumption 
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 
(2002) (citing at least one hundred studies). 
 195. Id. at 94–95. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 147–56. 
 198. Id. at 140–46. 
 199. Id. at 156–60. 
 200. Id. at 105–19. 
 201. For example, the rate of time discount applied to choices in different areas may vary. 
See Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, supra note 22, at 394 (“Since different motives 
may be invoked to different degrees by different situations (and by different descriptions of the 
same situation), developing descriptively accurate models of intertemporal choice will not be 
easy.”)(emphasis added). 
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As we have seen previously, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
literature claims that individuals have a long-run rate of time 
discount corresponding to their true intertemporal preferences as 
well as an excessive rate corresponding to their lack of willpower. 
Those with self-control problems will give the future negative 
consequences of their actions less weight than they should. In 
particular, individuals may consume goods with large current 
benefits and significant long-term health costs because they lack the 
power to resist temptation.202 
The difficulties posed by heterogeneity of individuals are best 
illustrated by the policy of sin taxes. Following O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, let us call the generic sin good to be taxed “potato chips.”203 
In a world with no costs of determining or collecting taxes, the 
first best optimum would be for the state to impose an individually 
calibrated tax on each individual corresponding to his degree of 
excessive impatience and the negative health consequences of potato-
chip consumption. Then, the benefits to the present self of potato 
chips would be reduced by the negative consequences to future 
selves now made present by the tax. But obviously, this is not a 
practical suggestion. The paternalist is really faced with the necessity 
of determining a single or uniform tax rate that will apply to 
everyone regardless of his particular degree of excessive impatience. 
The tax will be too high for some, too low for others, and for a few 
just right. 
The problem that is faced by the paternalist is to find the 
uniform tax rate that will minimize the cost of “errors” committed 
by the consumer.204 The first error is that of over-consumption of 
potato chips, and the second error is the under-consumption of 
potato chips. Not every reduction in potato chip consumption by 
those who are consuming too much in the no-tax status quo is a 
benefit, because some may decrease their consumption too much. 
And some, without self-control problems, may be consuming just 
the right amount under the status quo. Therefore, the benefits of 
reducing potato chip consumption towards the optimum must be 
balanced against the costs of reducing consumption too much. 
 
 202. Cf. O’Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 3, at 1826. 
 203. See id. 
 204. For concreteness and precision, we follow the basic structure of the model 
developed in O’Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 3. 
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What must the paternalist policy maker know in order to 
determine whether a proposed tax rate will enhance or reduce 
welfare relative to the no-tax baseline? In the general case, he must 
know the distribution (the population heterogeneity) of the degree 
of self-control bias.205 Some individuals will have greater self-control 
problems than others, and some will have no self-control problem as 
we conceive of it here. In addition, he must know something about 
the heterogeneity in people’s tastes for potato chips and their 
susceptibility to adverse health consequences.206 Thus, the 
distribution of immediate consumption benefits and future health 
costs must be known. Furthermore, the paternalist must know the 
elasticity or responsiveness of consumption at different tax rates in 
order to determine how much a given increment in tax will reduce 
consumption.207 It is particularly important to know whether the 
degree of self-control problem is correlated with responsiveness 
because, if it is, a given tax will reduce consumption by different 
amounts by those with greater or lesser control problems. All of 
these factors will affect both the optimal tax rate and our ability to 
know whether we have improved matters overall. The problem is that 
we do not have, and are not likely to get in the near future, reliable 
data on these parameters.208 In addition, there will no doubt be 
different relevant distributions for different kinds of sin goods. 
Cigarettes, fatty hamburgers, transfat french fries, hard liquor, lack of 
exercise, sugary desserts, and refined carbohydrates are different areas 
with different temptations and consequences. 
In actual policymaking, the likely result of these complications is 
that they will be ignored. The paternalist will, in practice, be satisfied 
if potato chip consumption simply falls with no thought of the costs. 
Thus his preferences will supplant those of the individuals. Once 
again, the new paternalism in theory will be more like the old 
paternalism in practice. 
 
 205. See id. at 1841. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. It is clear from their discussion that O’Donoghue and Rabin are simply making 
“back of envelope” calculations in their own example with no pretense of empirical accuracy. 
See id. at 1836–39. 
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B. Heterogeneity on Multiple Dimensions 
As we have seen, when individuals differ with respect to a single 
bias, the policymaker’s task is complicated by the need to calibrate 
the policy—say, a fat tax—to the population distribution of that bias 
and not to the single or average case.209 However, as we have also 
seen, people exhibit more than one bias at a time. Each bias is itself 
not uniform across individuals. The policymaker’s problem now 
becomes the calibration of policy to the distributions of multiple, 
possibly conflicting or reinforcing, biases. The optimizing 
mathematics of this situation is no doubt complex. The 
insurmountable character of the problem becomes apparent when we 
recognize that individuals will exhibit heterogeneity along every 
dimension discussed thus far in this article. Given the dearth of 
research on this topic, we offer only a partial list of the relevant ways 
in which individuals differ. 
1. Fraction of individuals exhibiting a type of bias  
Even if most individuals are subject to some sort of bias, not 
every individual will be subject to the very same biases.210 Some have 
greater problems with weakness of will; others are most susceptible 
to making rash choices in hot states; yet others are most likely to fall 
prey to framing effects. The paternalist policy designer needs to 
know what fraction of the population falls into each category of bias. 
A larger fraction will tend to justify more, and more extensive, 
interventions, while a smaller fraction will justify fewer, and less 
extensive, interventions. 
2. Extent of bias 
As discussed earlier, optimal paternalist policy depends on 
knowledge of the extent of a bias, not merely its existence. Yet the 
extent of bias will differ across individuals. Among those subject to 
emotional (hot-state) decision-making, some will be more rash than 
others and have more to regret later. Among people with willpower 
problems, some people have bigger willpower problems than others. 
Among people with impatience problems, some will have greater 
impatience and others will have less. 
 
 209. See id. 
 210. See Krueger & Funder, supra note 154, at 317 tbl.1. 
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3. Extent of self-debiasing 
Individuals who are aware of their own bias problems will often 
try to correct them. But by their very nature, self-debiasing efforts 
are idiosyncratic. People will differ in their self-debiasing efforts by 
(a) the methods chosen, (b) the areas of life in which they have 
attempted to debias, (c) the extent of interdependence of their 
debiasing methods across areas, and (d) their degree of success—or 
even over-success, in the case of individuals whose resolutions and 
commitments turn into self-denying compulsions. 
4. Degree of responsiveness to corrective measures 
People will differ in how much they respond to externally 
imposed debiasing policies. Some biases may be so strong or resistant 
to correction that costs—including externally imposed ones—are 
simply ignored. For example, a severe overeating problem could 
result from a strong propensity to underweight future costs relative 
to present benefits. A strongly present-biased person might care as 
little about future wealth as future health, whereas a mildly present-
biased person might care a great deal about future wealth. If so, then 
a fat tax would have little effect on the former and a large effect on 
the latter. Effects like this have been observed with respect to 
existing sin taxes; for example, it turns out that moderate drinkers 
are more responsive to changes in price than are heavy drinkers.211 
5. Susceptibility of self-debiasing to unraveling  
Given that self-control and external control can act as substitutes, 
the extent of their substitutability will matter for policy. But the 
extent of substitutability will also differ across individuals. Some 
people will substantially reduce their self-control efforts in response 
to paternalist policy, while others may reduce their self-control little 
or not at all. 
XII. CONCLUSIONS: THE ROAD BACK TO OLD PATERNALISM 
Let us make a short recapitulation of the many forms of 
knowledge that a paternalist policymaker must possess in order for 
his policies to have any reasonable expectation of improving welfare. 
 
 211. Brent D. Mast, Bruce L. Benson & David W. Rasmussen, Beer Taxation and 
Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities, 66 S. ECON. J. 214, 217 (1999). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009 10:03 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
966 
First, the paternalist must know individuals’ “true” underlying 
preferences—which, by the paternalist’s own hypothesis, are not 
(simply) revealed by choices. In doing so, he must choose between 
different and conflicting preference sets that seem to motivate 
individual behavior under different circumstances, without any firm 
theoretical means of doing so. Second, the paternalist must discover 
the extent of any given bias, understanding that any given bias will 
differ from time to time, place to place, and situation to situation—
even for a single individual. Third, the paternalist must possess 
extensive knowledge of the self-debiasing measures adopted by 
individuals. Such measures come in a wide variety of forms and often 
depend on contextual features of the environment. Fourth, the 
paternalist must account for the interdependence of biases. This 
means that even comprehensive knowledge of a single bias is not 
sufficient to justify paternalist correction of that bias; the paternalist 
must understand the complex interaction of multiple biases. Fifth, 
the paternalist must anticipate and account for how paternalist 
policies may reduce the extent of self-regulation, both in the targeted 
field of activity and others as well. And sixth, the paternalist must 
possess all of the above kinds of knowledge not merely at the 
individual level, but at the level of the whole population. Knowledge 
of averages or general tendencies is not sufficient, as any given policy 
will affect people in different and sometimes offsetting ways. 
One obvious defense of the new paternalist project is to say we 
simply need to collect more information. This, in itself, constitutes a 
major concession; it means recent proposals for paternalist 
interventions should at least be put on hold until superior 
information becomes available. But more importantly, this defense 
fails because much of the necessary knowledge is unavailable to a 
paternalist planner in principle. The relevant information about the 
extent of real-world biases is necessarily local in character; that is, it 
depends on particular characteristics of time and place. It changes 
from moment to moment and situation to situation. It differs 
substantially across individuals. It is affected by multifarious forms of 
self-regulation. It generally cannot be collected in a laboratory 
setting, because decision biases “in the wild” are what matter for 
policy. But in the wild, as opposed to the lab, there usually does not 
exist a means of holding other factors constant in order to “fix” the 
individual’s true preferences and thus to measure deviations from 
them. 
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Moreover, much of the necessary information is tacit, meaning 
that it cannot be communicated easily. An individual might have 
great difficulty explaining what things are most tempting to him 
even if he wanted to. Some forms of self-correction are unconscious, 
occurring in ways that the individual is not even aware of. And no 
amount of data collection can overcome the theoretical problem of 
selecting among competing preference sets held by a single 
individual. Even if it is granted that an individual has “true” 
preferences, the paternalists have not yet enunciated a clear means of 
determining which preferences are true. The true preferences, by 
their very nature, exist only within an individual’s brain and, as the 
new paternalists themselves insist, they are not straightforwardly 
revealed by choice. 
Another defense of the new paternalist project is to deny that so 
much knowledge is really needed. According to this defense, all 
policymakers really need is a knowledge of averages or general 
tendencies. They might not be able to craft perfectly optimal 
policies, but they can make marginal changes that will improve 
welfare relative to the status quo. This defense is simply mistaken, 
largely because of the effects of heterogeneity. When a policy will 
produce positive effects for some and negative effects for others, only 
a knowledge of the distribution of such effects is sufficient to make a 
prima facie case that an intervention is welfare-improving. Even 
knowing that the average or typical person is in need of paternalistic 
assistance is not sufficient because (a) the average or typical person 
could be less responsive to corrective measures than others who do 
not need the assistance or who need it less; or (b) the average or 
typical person might respond in counterproductive ways, such as 
reducing self-corrective efforts. 
In any case, both defenses just offered rely on an excessively 
optimistic conception of the political process. They imagine careful 
and comprehensive investigation by intelligent, well-meaning, and 
motivated political actors. The reality would assuredly be much 
different. Faced with daunting, and often insurmountable, barriers to 
accessing and processing all the information they need, politicians 
and bureaucrats will more likely rely on rules of thumb. Lacking 
information about true preferences, they will tend to appeal to their 
own preferences or to socially approved preferences. 
For instance, what would be considered evidence of a real-world 
anti-obesity measure (like a fat tax) having been effective? Keep in 
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mind that behavioral economics emphatically does not indicate that 
obesity is necessarily an irrational decision. An honest and accurate 
measure of an anti-obesity measure’s efficacy would have to measure 
(somehow) both the gains to people who are nudged closer to their 
true preferences and the losses to people who are nudged further 
away—including people who are not obese but who are motivated to 
change their behavior anyway, as well as to people who really are 
obese but whose true underlying preferences justify their condition. 
We are not sure how the government would even begin to collect 
such information. But no matter, because in the real world of politics 
we suspect that only falling rates of obesity will suffice. “Eating 
right” is the socially approved preference. 
And thus the new paternalism transforms, in practice, into the 
old. In principle, we can embrace the idea of making people better 
off according to their own true preferences. That goal cannot be 
made operational in practice without access to information that 
policymakers do not, will not, and often cannot possess. Yet 
policymakers have to make policy on the basis of something, and so 
they will appeal to their own preferences, the preferences of self-
appointed experts, or the (alleged) preferences of the public at large. 
They cannot implement people’s “true” preferences, but they can 
implement what they believe are the “right” ones, and the new 
paternalist paradigm will provide the intellectual cover to do so. 
 
